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saac and Mag Kennedy, a black man and a white woman, were
convicted of fornication-sex between unmarried persons-in
North Carolina in 1876.1 Though they had legally married in
South Carolina, the trial judge refused to acknowledge their mar-
riage since they had intentionally evaded their home state's pro-
hibition on interracial marriage.2 In the same month, and before
the same judge, Pink and Sarah Ross, another interracial couple,
were also indicted for fornication, despite having married in
South Carolina.3
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, however,
these two couples met with opposite results. The Kennedys' con-
victions were upheld because "when the law of North Carolina
declares that all marriages between negroes and white persons
shall be void, this is a personal incapacity which follows the par-
ties wherever they go so long as they remain domiciled in North
Carolina.''4 North Carolina's miscegenation law, the Court ex-
plained, "would be very idle if it could be avoided by merely
stepping over an imaginary line."5
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sity School of Law, as well as at the 2005 World Conference of the International
Society of Family Law. I also appreciate the research assistance given by Susann
Duffy, Sheila Hatami, and Rhonda Patterson and the summer funding provided by
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1 See State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251, 251 (1877) (describing trial court
proceedings).
2 See id.
3 See State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 242 (1877) (describing trial court proceedings).
4 Kennedy, 76 N.C. at 252 (emphasis added).
5 Id. at 252-53.
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But the Rosses met with a better fate. At the time of their
marriage, both were legally domiciled in South Carolina and only
after solemnizing their union did they migrate to North Caro-
lina.6 Because of the "obligations of comity to our sister States,"
the Court decreed that the South Carolina union be honored,
"[h]owever revolting to us and to all persons.., such a marriage
may appear."7
That the North Carolina Supreme Court was faced with two
such similar cases during one term reflects the real and ongoing
conflicts produced by longstanding disagreements among states
about the regulation of marriage. That the cases were decided
differently reflects the compromise of the era: while states were
free to disregard marriages validly celebrated in another state,
principles of comity often, but not always, counseled toleration.
This history and those principles are important to remember as
the United States revisits the problem of non-uniform marriage
laws for the first time in decades. With the 2004 legalization of
same-sex marriage in Massachusetts,8 there is now a significant
variation in state marriage laws. While a few other states may
soon follow,9 for now Massachusetts is the only American state
in which same-sex couples may legally marry.1 °
While non-uniform marriage laws and the conflicts they engen-
der are not new, the most significant disagreements among states
about marriage law were resolved by the last third of the twenti-
eth century. Thus, the recent introduction of same-sex marriage
in a single state has disrupted a period of relative calm. In prior
eras, states had routinely struggled with marriage recognition
6 Ross, 76 N.C. at 243. Pink Ross had been a longstanding resident of South Car-
olina, and his domicile became hers by operation of law when they married. Id. at
242.
7 Id. at 246-47.
8 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
9 See infra notes 54-56 for a discussion of currently pending cases.
10 Massachusetts was, and still is, one of the states with gender-neutral marriage
laws on the books. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 1-9 (2003) (listing impediments
to marriage). The court in Goodridge, however, concluded that the existing statute
was not intended to encompass same-sex marriage despite the lack of an explicit
prohibition on the practice. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953. Although the legis-
lature never amended the relevant statutes to conform to the ruling in Goodridge,
clerks began issuing valid marriage licenses to same-sex couples on May 17, 2004.
See Pam Belluck, Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2004, at Al. Over 5000 same-sex couples, mostly female, have mar-
ried since then. See Ginia Bellafante, Even in Gay Circles, the Women Want the
Ring, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at I1.
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questions that arose because of sometimes stark disagreements
about impediments to marriage. Age, race, degree of relation,
and disabilities imposed upon divorce were the subjects that pro-
duced the most significant variations in state marriage laws.
Conflicts arose when couples married in one state and then
sought recognition of their union in another-whether because
they moved to a new state, had contracted an "evasive" marriage
in another state in violation of their home state's laws, or had
some transient contact with a state to which validity of their mar-
riage was relevant. Those conflicts were resolved, by and large,
according to the principle of comity, which was reflected, among
other places, in the rules governing conflict of laws. Those rules
dictated that states should generally recognize marriages that
were valid where celebrated-the so-called "place of celebra-
tion" rule-unless doing so interfered with an important public
policy or interest of the destination state. The "public policy"
objection was embodied in categorical exceptions for polyga-
mous and incestuous marriages and for marriages that violated a
state's "positive law." State statutes banning marriage evasion-
the term used to describe the practice of celebrating a marriage
outside of one's home state because of less restrictive laws-were
the prime example of such positive laws.
Applied to specific marriages, the general rule and its excep-
tions meant that states often accorded recognition to marriages
that they would not themselves permit. Recognition was some-
times extended to marriages that were evasive or even, as re-
flected in the court's language in State v. Ross, obviously
abhorrent to the state's own policies. Non-evasive interracial
marriages, for example, were routinely recognized in states that
banned miscegenation; underage marriages were recognized for
a variety of ad hoc reasons whether they were evasive or not; and
disfavored marriages of all kinds were often recognized for lim-
ited purposes, particularly if cohabitation within the prohibiting
state was not contemplated or possible.
A decade ago, one might have applied these principles to a
hypothetical situation involving same-sex marriage in Massachu-
setts and concluded that a same-sex marriage from one state
would certainly be recognized if it was celebrated by a couple
who legitimately resided in Massachusetts at the time of their
marriage and later moved to another state. One might also have
conjectured that evasive same-sex marriages might be recognized
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in some states, under some circumstances, though not predictably
so. Finally, one might have expected that the "incidents" of such
a marriage would be recognized for limited purposes like inheri-
tance rights in many states, even if the state did not fully accept
the couple's right to live as "married" within its borders.
Enter Hawaii. Hawaii almost legalized same-sex marriage in
the early 1990s, producing widespread concern about the effect
such a development might have on other states. The focal point
of the controversy was the widely held (or at least widely articu-
lated) belief that if same-sex marriages were legally celebrated in
Hawaii, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion would compel every other state to recognize those unions.
In response to this concern, Congress enacted the Defense of
Marriage Act, which defined marriage to include only heterosex-
ual unions for federal law purposes and amended the Full Faith
and Credit Act to provide that states need not recognize same-
sex marriages from sister states. Within a decade, four-fifths of
the states had accepted Congress' "invitation" and either
amended their marriage laws, their state constitutions, or both, to
ban same-sex couples from marrying within the state and, in
many states, to explicitly refuse recognition to an out-of-state
same-sex marriage, even if valid where celebrated.
This vast legal structure was erected, however, to prevent a
problem that historically did not exist. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause had never been understood to compel one state to recog-
nize another state's marriage without regard to its own laws and
policies. To the contrary, states have always had, and freely exer-
cised, the right to refuse recognition to out-of-state marriages.
The misapprehension about full faith and credit, and the pur-
ported ability of a single state to dictate marriage policy for the
nation, was more than a harmless tangent, however. It fueled a
modern response that has obscured a longstanding tradition of
state respect for each others' marriage laws and the flexible ap-
proach to interstate marriage recognition that came with it. In
protecting themselves from a myth, states have lost the ability to
grant recognition to a particular prohibited marriage or an inci-
dent of it, a right they exercised considerably more often histori-
cally than the right to refuse recognition. The traditional, more
sensible approach to recognition, which permits consideration of
competing interests like the expectations of the parties, the im-
pact of non-recognition on the couple's children, as well as the
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strength and validity of the state's interest in refusing recognition
to a particular union under particular circumstances or to same-
sex unions generally, is thus precluded in most jurisdictions by
the modern regime.
This Article explores the forces that propelled this harsh, in-
flexible approach to marriage recognition and the unprecedented
terrain we now face. Part I first considers the variation among
state marriage laws in the early, modern, and ultra-modern peri-
ods. It then, in Part II, examines the anti-same-sex marriage
structure erected in response to the potential legalization of
same-sex marriage in the 1990s, with a particular focus on the
role played by full faith and credit principles in animating the
statutory and constitutional reform movement and shaping its
contours. Part III reconsiders the traditional approach to mar-
riage recognition, which combined a pro-recognition general rule
with standard exceptions to protect state interests, and the typi-
cal justifications for it. Part IV re-examines the traditional recog-
nition principles against the modern same-sex marriage
landscape. This Part also considers whether states that have en-
acted barriers to recognition have done so successfully, given his-
torical requirements that the intent to refuse recognition be clear
and unmistakable. And, for states with no identifiable barrier to
recognition of a same-sex marriage from another state, it consid-
ers how the traditional principles might guide courts in analyzing
questions of interstate marriage recognition. The Article con-
cludes by urging a more flexible, nuanced approach to marriage
recognition, one that would more faithfully honor a longstanding
historical tradition of comity among states.
I
NON-UNIFORMITY OF MARRIAGE LAWS
A. Early Variations in Marriage Laws
American states maintained a variety of restrictions on mar-
riage throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth
centuries. All states imposed some restrictions on marriage
based either on the capacity of the individual or the nature of the
union, and many of the restrictions were more or less universal.
For example, all states prohibited polygamous marriages1 and
11 See, e.g., CHESTER G. VERNIER, 1 AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE FAMILY LAW OF THE FORTY-EIGHT AMERICAN STATES, ALASKA,
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consanguineous marriages within a certain degree. 12 Most states
expressly prohibited the insane from marrying,13 and "imbeciles"
were also forbidden to marry.14
Other restrictions were common, but not universal. Many
states restricted marriages by individuals with certain diseases,
including, most commonly, epilepsy, venereal disease, and tuber-
culosis. 5 All states had age requirements, but there was signifi-
cant variation in both the minimum age to marry and the
minimum age to marry without parental consent.16 All but
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND HAWAII (TO JAN. 1, 1931) § 46, at 214 (1931)
("Bigamous marriages are both criminally and civilly condemned by all fifty-one of
the American jurisdictions."). These state bans were reinforced, and, in some cases,
induced by, a strong federal policy against polygamy. See, e.g., Morrill Act, ch. 126,
12 Stat. 501 (1862) (repealed 1910) (criminalizing polygamy); see also Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding bans on polygamy constitutional).
12 See VERNIER, supra note 11, § 38, at 173-74 ("Upon the subject of marriages
prohibited because of consanguinity, all fifty-one of the American jurisdictions have
statutes. Moreover, surprising as it may seem, there is, up to a certain point, a lauda-
ble degree of uniformity in the statutes."). At a minimum, states prohibited individ-
uals from marrying ancestors, descendants, or siblings. Most also banned aunt-
nephew and uncle-niece unions, though some made exceptions for such marriages if
sanctioned by recognized religious rules. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-415-4 (1938)
(permitting any marriage "which shall be solemnized among the Jews, within the
degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion"). The most common
definition of incest prohibits relatives closer than the fourth degree from marrying,
which derives from the Bible's Book of Leviticus. Leviticus 18:6-18. First cousins
are relatives of the fourth degree and are thus permitted to marry one another under
the biblical restriction. See JESSE DUKEMINIER et aL, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
79 (7th ed. 2005) (reprinting the Table of Consanguinity, which illustrates degrees of
kinship).
13 See VERNIER, supra note 11, § 41, at 189 (noting that the greatest dispute
among states with respect to insanity was whether it should render a marriage void
or voidable); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVID-
UALS, AND THE LAW 53 (2004) (describing state regulation of the insane with respect
to marriage and reproduction). States did not generally prohibit marriage based on
physical incapacity (impotence), but most permitted the other party to seek an an-
nulment on that basis. See VERNIER, supra note 11, § 42, at 197.
1 4 JOHN W. MORLAND, KEEZER ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 198
(3d ed. 1946) ("No insane person or idiot is capable of contracting a marriage.").
15 See id. at 200-01; see also VERNIER, supra note 11, § 43, at 200 tbl.XIV (provid-
ing a compilation of state marriage restrictions based on disease). Noting the justifi-
cation for disease restrictions, Vernier commented that "it is difficult to see how a
marriage participated in by such a diseased person can fail to have disastrous results
both for the parties themselves and their families, and for society." Id. at 199.
16 Kansas, for example, once permitted a 12-year-old female to marry with paren-
tal consent, while Arizona would not permit her to marry until age 16. See MOR-
LAND, supra note 14, at 210-11; see also VERNIER, supra note 11, § 40, at 187 (noting
"considerable variation in the age standard adopted by the various states"). In al-
most every state, the age requirements differed for males and females. Females
could generally marry two to three years younger than their male counterparts. See
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twelve states banned interracial marriage at some point in his-
tory,17 and two-thirds of those retained such a ban at least into
the middle of the twentieth century.18 There were variations in
incest laws as well. A substantial minority of states did not ban
first-cousin marriages.' 9 Nearly half the states prohibited some
marriages based on relationships of affinity (by marriage). 20 Sev-
eral also imposed restrictions on remarriage following divorce,
either in the form of a waiting period or, more severely, a com-
plete ban during the lifetime of the innocent spouse.2'
In addition, states had substantial disagreement on two proce-
dural rules that directly affected the validity of marriage. First,
states were split on whether a marriage could be formed without
licensure and solemnization-a common law marriage. As of
1931, roughly half of the states permitted common law mar-
riage,22 but many of the remaining states had expressly abolished
the practice sometime in the previous half-century. Second,
states varied in their stance on marriage evasion-the practice of
marrying out of state to take advantage of more lenient marriage
laws and then returning home. Again, in 1931, seventeen states
expressly forbade the practice.23
The non-uniformities among states were thus real. As one
commentator noted about the state of marriage laws in 1919:
MORLAND, supra note 14, at 210-13 (compiling a chart of state statutes on marriage
rules respecting age).
17 See Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States
Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 611, 627-28 & n.84 (2004).
18 See VERNIER, supra note 11, § 44, at 206-09 tbl.XV (compiling miscegenation
statutes existing in thirty states in 1931).
19 See id. § 38, at 174 ("Twenty-nine jurisdictions prohibit the marriage of first
cousins, a view upon which there is considerable controversy.").
20 See id. § 39, at 183 (noting the American departure from English law, under
which "relationship by affinity was an impediment to marriage to the same extent
and in the same degree as consanguinity"); MORLAND, supra note 14, at 219; see
also, e.g., RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 36-415-1 to -2 (1938) (prohibiting, among others, a
marriage to one's wife's mother or husband's father).
21 See VERNIER, supra note 11, § 60, at 296 (noting that thirty-six states had
"placed conditions and limitations on the right to remarry after absolute divorce").
Lifetime remarriage restrictions were typically reserved for defendant-spouses in di-
vorces premised on adultery. See, e.g., In re Lenherr's Estate, 314 A.2d 255, 257
(Pa. 1974) (considering extraterritorial effect of Pennsylvania's law banning remar-
riage by adulterer during lifetime of the other spouse).
22 See VERNIER, supra note 11, § 26, at 106-08 tbl.IV (comparing state-law tabula-
tions in five contemporaneous treatises).2 3 See id. § 45, at 209; see also MARY E. RICHMOND & FRED S. HALL, MARRIAGE
AND THE STATE 370-71 app. B (1929) (identifying eighteen states in 1928 that pro-
hibited evasive marriage).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
"After all these years of endeavor and experimentation, look at
the diversity-the chaos even-of laws! "24 These differences in
marriage laws gave rise to conflicts and periodic quests for
greater uniformity. When the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) was founded in 1892,
its goal was to seek "greater unanimity of law throughout the
country in those matters in which such unanimity is both desira-
ble and possible. 25 Encouraging uniformity of marriage and di-
vorce laws was among the Conference's primary original
objectives and remained central to its mission for nearly a
century.26
Despite concern about the degree of variation among states
and at least a modicum of public upset with evasive marriage
practices, NCCUSL mostly sidestepped the question of marriage
impediments in its early acts. Although many states shared the
frustration of having their strict standards undermined by their
neighbors' laxer ones, they were, by and large, unwilling to agree
to a more uniform approach.
The National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws, which con-
vened in Philadelphia in 1906 and produced a draft uniform di-
vorce law, urged NCCUSL to draft a uniform marriage law as
well.27 But NCCUSL demurred, preferring to tackle the more
contentious issue of migratory divorce first.28 The 1907 Act to
Regulate the Law of Annulment of Marriage and Divorce did,
nonetheless, indirectly regulate marriage in two ways. First, it
prescribed uniform grounds for annulment of marriage, which re-
flect the defects that render a marriage void (bigamy or incest) or
voidable (impotency, fraud, insanity, or non-age). 29 If a particu-
lar impediment renders a marriage void, it is, in effect, a mar-
riage prohibition. The Act also proposed a one-year waiting
24 See RICHMOND & HALL, supra note 23, at 202.
25 REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE STATE BOARDS
OF COMMISSIONERS FOR PROMOTING UNIFORMITY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(1892).
26 See id. at 10 ("Marriage and Divorce: There is probably no question on which
there is greater general necessity to have uniformity of law than this .... ").
27 Report of the Committee on Marriage and Divorce, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws 122 (1907) [hereinafter 1907 Report].
28 Id. Migratory divorce, the parallel to evasive marriage, was the term used to
describe the practice of going to a state for the purpose of obtaining a divorce on
terms or under circumstances one's home state would not permit.29 Id. at 124-25 (An Act to Make Uniform the Law Regulating Annulment of Mar-
riage and Divorce, § 1 (a)-(g)) (withdrawn 1928).
[Vol. 84, 2005]
Resurrecting Comity
period between an initial and final decree of divorce, which also,
in effect, imposes a restriction on marriage (or at least remar-
riage).3" The 1907 Act was adopted by only three states, how-
ever, and thus met a fate similar to contemporaneous laws
establishing uniform rules of divorce.31
NCCUSL returned to the question of marriage regulation in
1911 when it promulgated the Uniform Marriage and Marriage
License Act.32 This act was mainly procedural. It provided de-
tailed mechanisms for verifying the eligibility of the parties to a
marriage and permitted third parties greater opportunity to ob-
ject before marriages were celebrated.33 It also made licensure
and solemnization a requirement for a valid marriage, which was
designed to eliminate common law marriage in adopting jurisdic-
tions.34 But again, this act was adopted in only two states and
thus had little effect on the overall state of uniformity of mar-
riage laws.35
A 1950 uniform act, the Uniform Marriage License Applica-
tion Act, was also primarily procedural. It adopted a waiting pe-
riod between application and issuance of a marriage license,
required a blood test as a prerequisite to issuance of a license,
and made all license applications a matter of public record. NC-
CUSL's interest in establishing uniform laws on these topics de-
rived from the:
[Wiell-known fact that at present, where a state having rigid
requirements regarding the issuance of licenses in these re-
spects adjoins a state in which the requirements are more lax,
there is a tendency towards avoidance of the more rigid re-
quirements by crossing the state line and obtaining a marriage
30 See id. at 128-29 § 17.
31 See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN
ITS 103RD YEAR 1347-54 tbl.IV (1994) [hereinafter 1994 HANDBOOK] (recording the
status and adoption history of all uniform acts promulgated by the Conference). In
1907, the Conference had also adopted An Act Providing for the Return of Marriage
Statistics, which required counties in an adopting state to collect a variety of data
points about each marriage, including the race, age, and occupation of the parties, as
well as the number of prior marriages and divorces for each spouse. See 1907 Re-
port, supra note 27, at 133. This Act was only adopted by a single state. See 1994
HANDBOOK, supra, at 1348 tbl.IV.
32 See 9 U.L.A. 187 (1923) (withdrawn 1943).
33 See id. at 198-200 §§ 5-6. The act imposed a criminal penalty for unlawful issu-
ance of a license or for making a false statement about any fact relating to compe-
tency to marry. See id. at 202-203 §§ 7-8.
34 See id. at 191 § 1, 217 § 23.
35 1994 HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 1351 tbl.IV.
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license in the adjoining state.36
The prefatory note explained that other aspects of uniformity,
which had been sought in the 1911 act, were no longer as desira-
ble. The minimum age for marriage, for example, might reasona-
bly differ from state to state because of "varying social conditions
throughout the country."37 This Act was adopted in only a single
state, 38 proving NCCUSL's long-term interest in standardizing
marriage laws to be uniformly unsuccessful.
Throughout this period, there were other attempts to create
uniformity, including numerous attempts to amend the federal
Constitution either to ban certain types of marriages outright
(polygamous and interracial ones) or to give Congress the au-
thority to set national marriage policy.3 9 Not one ever became
law. Marriage laws in the United States thus remained remarka-
bly non-uniform well into the twentieth century.
B. Modern Variations in Marriage Laws
The differences that had been so pronounced in the first half of
the twentieth century all but disappeared in the second half. A
number of independent forces had unwittingly aligned to create
virtually uniform marriage laws. Arguably the most important
development was the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Loving v.
Virginia,a° which held anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional.
During the same era, the eugenics movement in which several
marriage restrictions were rooted fell out of favor, and cultural
attitudes about children evolved.41 Together, these changes led
states to eliminate marriage prohibitions that were rooted in con-
cerns about the passage of undesirable genetic traits and to grad-
ually increase the minimum age for marriage.
A snapshot of state marriage laws circa 1995 reveals a remark-
ably uniform system, especially remarkable given the lack of fed-
eral control or national marriage policy and the repeated failure
of historical efforts to secure uniformity among state laws
3 6 
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS
FiFty-NiNTH YEAR 242 (1950) (Prefatory Note to Unif. Marriage License Applica-
tion Act (withdrawn 1966)).
37 Id.
38 See 1994 HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 1347 tbl.IV.
39 See Stein, supra note 17, at 627-41 (summarizing proposed amendments).
40 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41 See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 56-60.
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through voluntary cooperation. All states continued to prohibit
marriages that were bigamous, were incestuous closer than the
fourth degree, or involved a minor below a certain age.
Variations persisted, though, on the permissibility of marriages
between first cousins42 and common law marriages.43 But other
variations had lessened significantly. Most if not all restrictions
on marriages by affinity had been abolished. 4 All but a handful
of states by then permitted marriage without parental consent at
age eighteen; the remaining few had set the age at twenty-one.45
With parental consent, most states permitted minors to marry at
age sixteen, sometimes even earlier in the case of pregnancy.46
Only one state continued to differentiate between males and fe-
males for marriage age.47 Only a handful of states still imposed a
remarriage waiting period following divorce.48
42 Twenty-five states prohibit first cousins from marrying altogether. See, e.g.,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1, 2 (2004). Eighteen permit them to marry without
limitation. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.021 (2004) (prohibiting marriage when
the parties are "more closely related ... than the fourth degree of consanguinity,"
which does not include first cousins). Seven states permit first cousins to marry sub-
ject to certain conditions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (2000) (permit-
ting first cousins to marry only if both are sixty-five years old or older or if one or
both first cousins are under sixty-five years old, with judicial approval based on
proof that one of the cousins is unable to produce).
43 Today, ten states and the District of Columbia permit couples to contract com-
mon law marriages. Seven additional states either grandfather in common law mar-
riages contracted before a certain date or recognize them for additional purposes.
See National Conference of State Legislatures, Common Law Marriage, http://www.
ncsl.org/programs/cyf/commonlaw.htm.
44 See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE Ac-r 9A U.L.A. 161 (amended 1973)
(Prefatory Note) (noting trend toward abolishing all restrictions based on affinity).
45 See Guide to Legal Impediments to Marriage for 57 Registration Jurisdictions
(Feb. 10, 2005), at http://www.mass.gov/dphfbhsre/rvr/impedimentsl %20.pdf (indi-
cating that every state but six allows both men and women to marry without paren-
tal consent at the age of eighteen).
46 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-103 (West 2004) (permitting court to grant
permission for marriage below the minimum age when the female is pregnant or has
given birth). Texas still permits marriage by non-parent fourteen-year-olds with pa-
rental consent. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon 1998).
47 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-102 (West 2004) (permitting a male who is seven-
teen years old and a female who is sixteen years old to contract for marriage with
written consent of a parent or guardian).
48 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-8, 30-2-10 (2004) (prohibiting parties to a divorce
from marrying, except to each other, within sixty days of when the judgment is en-
tered and permitting a court to deny either party the right to remarry permanently);
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2339, 2341 (West 2004) (imposing a six-month waiting period
for remarriage after divorce and denying the right to remarry pending appeal of a
divorce judgment if the appealing party specifically objects to the termination of the
marriage status).
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A few states maintained other idiosyncratic restrictions, such
as Nebraska, which did not permit anyone "afflicted with a vene-
real disease" to marry, 9 or Tennessee, which prohibited issuance
of a license to a couple if either party is drunk at the time of
application.5" Same-sex marriage had not made its mark in the
public conscience yet, and, thus, most state statutes were silent
on the subject.51 No state affirmatively authorized same-sex mar-
riage, but very few expressly precluded it.52
C. Recent Variations in Marriage Laws
Fast-forward a decade to the present day, in which the mar-
riage landscape has dramatically changed. Same-sex marriage is
now legal in Massachusetts.53 Lower courts in New York,5"
Washington,55 and California56 have held that a ban on same-sex
marriage violates their respective state constitutions.57 If those
4 9 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (2004).50 TENN. CODE ANN. 36-3-109 (2004).
51 Compare, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-201(1) (1990) ("Marriage is a personal rela-
tion arising out of a civil contract to which the consent of the parties capable of
making it is necessary."), with IDAHO CODE § 32-201(1) (2004) ("Marriage is a per-
sonal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, to which
the consent of parties capable of making it is necessary.") (amendment effective
1996).52 Wyoming was one of the only states to expressly mention gender in its marriage
statute before the modern era. See WYo. STAT. § 20-1-101 (1957) ("Marriage is a
civil contract between a male and a female person to which the consent of the par-
ties capable of contracting is essential.")
53 See supra notes 8-10.
54 See Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (declaring the state
constitution to require that same-sex couples be permitted to marry). In Her-
nandez, the defendant attempted to appeal directly to the state's highest court, but
the request was denied. Hernandez v. Robles, 796 N.Y.S.2d 577 (2005).
55 See Anderson v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447
(Wash. Super. Aug. 4, 2004) (invalidating same-sex marriage ban under state consti-
tution). Anderson was argued before the state's highest court on March 8, 2005.
56 In re Council Coordination Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage
Cases, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005) (tentative decision)
(holding that state ban on same-sex marriage and ban on recognition of same-sex
marriages from other states both violate the state constitution).
57 Lower courts in three other states - Hawaii, Alaska, and Oregon - struck down
their respective state's ban on same-sex marriage, but each was overridden by a
subsequent amendment to the state constitution. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993); Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1999); Li v. State, 2004 WL
1258167 (Or. Cir. Apr. 20, 2004). In the last two years, lower courts in several other
states have rejected similar challenges to same-sex marriage bans. See Standhardt v.
Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2005); Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004); Samuels v.
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rulings survive appeal, same-sex marriages could become legal in
those states as well. Vermont, Connecticut, and California pro-
vide same-sex couples with a civil status equivalent to marriage.58
Internationally, Belgium and the Netherlands have permitted
same-sex marriage for several years,59 and both Canada and
Spain have recently authorized it.6"
II
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE MODERN REACTION
TO NON-UNIFORMITY
While the legalization of same-sex marriage in one American
state is certainly a noteworthy development, the steps taken in
opposition to same-sex marriages are in some ways more remark-
able. Spurred first by the fear that Hawaii might legalize same-
sex marriage in the early 1990s,61 and later by the reality that
N.Y. State Dept. of Health, No. 1967-04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). Earlier cases had
rejected similar claims, though generally without serious discussion of any constitu-
tional challenge. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995);
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973) ("In our view, however, no consti-
tutional issue is involved."); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971)
(upholding denial of marriage license to same-sex couple), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972) (appeal dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question").
58 In Vermont, the state supreme court's decision in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,
886 (Vt. 1999), led to the adoption of An Act to Create Civil Unions, which creates a
status different from civil marriage only in name. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 1201-07 (2004). Without judicial pressure, Connecticut adopted a civil union law
comparable to Vermont's in April 2005. See 2005 CONN LEGIS. SERV. 05-10 (West).
In California, the legislature expanded its domestic partnership status as of January
1, 2005 to be equivalent to marriage in most respects. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5
(West 2004).
59 See Herma Hill Kay, Same-Sex Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 15 KING'S C.
L.J. 63, 74 (2004) (discussing same-sex marriage developments on the international
front).
60 See An Act Respecting Certain Aspects of Legal Capacity for Marriage for Civil
Purposes, S.C. 2005, c. 33 (adopted July 21, 2005); see also Reference re Same-Sex
Marriage, 3 S.C.R. 698 (2004) (approving, in an advisory opinion, the constitutional-
ity of a proposed bill to legalize same-sex marriage). Even without the benefit of a
federal law, same-sex couples could already marry in Canada by virtue of provincial
court decisions invalidating the ban on same-sex unions. See, e.g., Halpern v. Ca-
nada (Attorney General), 65 O.R. 3d 161 (Ct. App. 2004) (ordering the immediate
issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Toronto). Spain adopted a law
legalizing same-sex marriage, effective July 3, 2005. See Proyecto De Lay Por la que
se modifica el Codigo Civil en materia de derecho a contraer matrimonio, 121/000018
(Jan. 21, 2005).
61 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and
Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 930-31 (1998) (summarizing legal developments
in Hawaii on the issue of same-sex marriage).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
Massachusetts did legalize same-sex marriage, an entirely new,
and historically unprecedented, statutory and constitutional
framework was erected.
A. The Defense of Marriage Act and State Analogs
Congress launched the formal anti-same-sex marriage re-
sponse with its passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
in 1996. DOMA does two basic things. Section three of the act
defines marriage for federal purposes as a union between a man
and a woman.62 Section two amends the Full Faith and Credit
Act to exempt same-sex marriages from recognition under prin-
ciples of full faith and credit. 63 This amendment states that:
No state, territory, or possession of the United States, or In-
dian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory,
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons
of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of
such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or
claim arising from such relationship.64
The essence of section two is to protect states against com-
pelled recognition of same-sex marriages from other states under
full faith and credit principles. Professor Lynn Wardle has ar-
gued that DOMA "establishes clearly a 'hands-off' federal posi-
tion-that federal authority will not be manipulated to compel
states to take either a pro- or contra- same-sex marriage position.
In this view, DOMA leaves the matter to each state individually,
to determine for itself."65 The federal neutrality, Wardle argued,
would permit states to recognize same-sex marriages or not as
they saw fit.6 6
Technically speaking, this characterization of DOMA is true.
Although DOMA refuses federal recognition to same-sex mar-
riages contracted anywhere, it does not require states to follow
the same course. However, the general misapprehension about
the operation of full faith and credit principles, reinforced by the
62 See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).
63 See id. § 2(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
64 See id. This second provision purports to derive authority from the "effects"
clause, discussed infra.
65 See Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, 104th Cong. 178 (1996) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3396] (statement




debate over DOMA and the media reports about Hawaii and its
potential impact on the rest of the nation, led states to believe
that if they did not take proactive measures to protect them-
selves, they would be compelled to recognize same-sex marriages
from other states.67 Congress thus facilitated, even if it did not
mandate, dissention among the states.68
States embraced DOMA's "offer" in large numbers by adding
express anti-same-sex marriage provisions, so-called "mini-DO-
MAs," to their state codes or constitutions. As of October 2005,
forty-four states explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage by statute
or constitutional amendment.69 Thirty-eight of those states also
refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage validly celebrated else-
where,"° and eleven of the thirty-eight refuse recognition not
only to the marriage itself, but also to all claims and rights arising
out of it or any related contract.71 Several states prohibit not
only same-sex marriage, but also alternative statuses like civil un-
ions and domestic partnerships as well.72 There are thus only six
67 See infra text accompanying notes 79-86.
68 Cf 142 CONG. REC. S10076-04 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Herma
Hill Kay, Dean, University of California, Berkeley School of Law) (noting that
DOMA "does not facilitate sister state relations," but rather "approv[es] dissention
among the states").
69 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(C) (2000) ("Marriage between per-
sons of the same sex is void and prohibited."). For a complete listing of current state
laws regarding same-sex marriage, see www.hofstra.edu/samesexchart. Between
1999 and 2005, eighteen states enacted constitutional amendments banning same-sex
marriage. Those states are: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ne-
vada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. At least fifteen additional states have
such amendments currently pending or under consideration in the legislature or
awaiting voter approval.
70 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (1998) ("The State of Alabama shall not rec-
ognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged
to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a
marriage license was issued."). The six sates that ban same-sex marriage but do not
expressly prohibit recognition are: Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, South Carolina,
Vermont, and Wyoming.
71 The eleven states are: Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. (This list includes
states that bar recognition "for any purpose.") The Kentucky code, for example,
states not only that a "marriage between members of the same-sex which occurs in
another jurisdiction shall be void in Kentucky," but also that "[a]ny rights granted
by virtue of the marriage, or its termination, shall be unenforceable in Kentucky
courts." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.045 (1)-(2) (West 2004).
72 See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16 ("Marriage shall be constituted by one man
and one woman only.... No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized
by the state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of marriage."). A provi-
sion in the Nebraska Constitution, stating that the "uniting of two persons of the
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states left without an explicit statutory or constitutional ban on
same-sex marriage,73 and in at least three of the six the state's
highest court or attorney general has interpreted the current stat-
utes, though silent on the issue, to prohibit same-sex marriage.74
The animating force behind the first wave of federal and state
anti-same-sex-marriage statutes was the belief that Hawaii was
on the cusp of legalizing same-sex marriage. The Hawaii Su-
preme Court had held in 1993, in Baehr v. Lewin, that refusing to
permit same-sex couples to marry was a form of sex discrimina-
tion that should be given strict scrutiny under the state constitu-
tion.75 Although the State of Hawaii failed on remand to prove a
compelling justification for excluding same-sex couples from civil
marriage, 76-a result that would have led to the legalization of
same-sex marriage-the outcome was eventually mooted by an
amendment to the state constitution giving the Hawaii legislature
the power to ban same-sex marriage, which it subsequently did.77
Even though same-sex marriage never materialized in Hawaii,
the state's impact on the national landscape was tremendous. As
Baehr proceeded on remand, all eyes were on Hawaii. Attention
same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relation-
ship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska," NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, was
recently invalidated by a federal district court on constitutional grounds. See Citi-
zens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1009 (D. Neb. 2005).
73 Those states are: Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin.
74 See N.Y. Op. (Inf.) Att'y Gen. No. 2004-1 (Mar. 3, 2004) ("We conclude that
the Legislature did not intend to authorize same-sex marriages."); N.M. Att'y Gen.
Advisory Letter (Feb. 20, 2004) ("New Mexico statutes, as they currently exist, con-
template that marriage will be between a man and a woman."); see also Georgina G.
v. Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680 n.1 (Wis. 1994) (noting that the existing marriage
law, which refers to "husband" and "wife," prohibits same-sex marriage). Rhode
Island also has a clean slate, but the state's attorney general declined the opportu-
nity to opine on whether the state's marriage law could be interpreted to permit or
prohibit same-sex marriage. See Press Release, State of Rhode Island, Department
of Attorney General, Attorney General Lynch's statement concerning same-sex
marriage (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/public/pr.php?ID=
209. An intermediate court of appeals in New Jersey has held that a ban on same-
sex marriage does not violate the state constitution, Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), but the ruling will be appealed to the state's high-
est court.
75 852 P.2d 44, 59-67 (Haw. 1993).
76 See Baehr v. Miike, CIV No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996), affd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
77 See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (adopted 1998) ("The legislature shall have the
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples."). The legislature later specified
that a marriage "shall be only between a man and a woman." HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 572-1 (Supp. 2004).
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was naturally drawn there, given the social importance of the
same-sex marriage issue, but the intensity of the focus was fueled
by the intervening debate about and enactment of DOMA in
1996.78
Hawaii's impact on both federal, and eventually state law, was
exacerbated by the perceived full faith and credit threat. The as-
sumption that recognition of Hawaii same-sex marriages by other
states would be both compelled and automatic, initially asserted
primarily in student law review notes79 and media reports,8 ° was
shared by both opponents and proponents of same-sex mar-
riage.81  For proponents, the claim represented both wishful
thinking and a component of their strategy to gain marriage
rights nationwide. For opponents of same-sex marriage gener-
ally, this assertion galvanized forces, imposed time pressure on
states to protect themselves from an exported marriage policy,
and provided powerful rhetoric to trigger legislative reactions.
Within the specific context of DOMA, the assertion gave op-
78 See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
79 See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdic-
tional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 152-53
(1998) [hereinafter Borchers, Baker v. General Motors] (noting that the "expansive
argument" about full faith and credit was "advanced mostly in student writing and
the popular press"); Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353
(2005) [hereinafter Borchers, Essential Irrelevance] (describing the assertion as
proof that "[s]ometimes ideas gain momentum through repetition"). Professor Larry
Kramer published an article in 1997 arguing that full faith and credit affects inter-
state marriage recognition, but he does not take the view that recognition is auto-
matic. He argues, instead, that because there is an equality aspect to full faith and
credit, a state cannot single out same-sex marriages for non-recognition. See Larry
Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Pol-
icy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1980-92 (1997). Even this narrower view, how-
ever, is not shared by most scholars.
80 See, e.g., Editorial, The Freedom to Marry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at 10
("The backlash against same-sex marriages is driven by social intolerance, but it also
poses an ominous challenge to the nation's Federal system of laws, and the basic
requirement in the U.S. Constitution that states give 'full faith and credit' to the
legal actions taken by other states."); Melissa Healy, House Backs Curbs on Gay
Marriages, L.A. TIMES, ouse House July 13, 1996, at 1 ("Under the 'full faith and
credit' clause of the U.S. Constitution, each state is obliged to recognize marriages
performed legally in any other state."); George de Lama, Hawaii May Lead Way On
Same-Sex Marriage, CHI. TRn., May 15, 1994, at 21 ("Traditionally, states recognize
marriages and other legal acts conducted in other states under the full-faith and
credit provision of the Constitution.")
81 See Borchers, Baker v. General Motors, supra note 79, at 185 ("[Bloth the
proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage have apparently assumed that the
Clause has a large role in [the same-sex marriage] question.").
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ponents the ability to argue for passage of the law on grounds of
federalism-to stop Hawaii's purported ability to export its na-
tional marriage policy to sister states over their ardent objec-
tions-rather than having to assume an express anti-gay-rights or
even a pro-traditional-marriage platform. In the debate over
DOMA, the full faith and credit claim provided the legal predi-
cate necessary to justify Congressional intervention. Senator
Trent Lott, for example, argued that if:
[S]uch a decision affected only Hawaii, we could leave it to the
residents of Hawaii to either live with the consequences or exer-
cise their political rights to change things. But a court decision
would not be limited to just one State. It would raise threaten-
ing possibilities in other States because of [the Full Faith and
Credit Clause].82
Many other voices in Congress echoed Lott's observation
about Hawaii's imperialist power. Representative McInnis
warned that: "What this country does not want is for one State
out of 50 States, that is, specifically the State of Hawaii, to be
able to mandate its wishes upon every other State in the
Union. '83 To "run[ ] the risk that a single judge in Hawaii may
re-define the scope of ... legislation throughout the other forty-
nine states," cautioned Hawaii State Legislator Terrence Tom, a
witness before a Congressional subcommittee, would be "a dere-
liction of the responsibilities [Congress was] invested with by the
voters."84 Section two of DOMA responds directly to this per-
ceived threat by encouraging states to ignore same-sex marriages
celebrated in Hawaii.
Those who opposed DOMA did not necessarily disagree with
the characterization of the effect of full faith and credit on same-
sex marriages. The late Representative Patsy Mink, for example,
agreed "laws of one State must be given 'full faith and credit' by
every other State," but insisted that "Congress should not be en-
acting any bill to declare otherwise. "85
The imminence of the threat was a recurring theme in the de-
bate over DOMA, but the legal predicate was only half the story.
The factual predicate necessary to make the legal predicate rele-
82 142 CONG. REC. S10100 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lott) (emphasis added).
83 142 CONG. REC. H7272 (1996) (statement of Rep. McInnis).
84 Hearing on H.R. 3396, supra note 65, at 52 (statement of Rep. Terrence Tom,
Hawaii State House of Representatives).
85 142 CONG. REC. H7481 (1996) (statement of Rep. Mink).
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vant played an important role as well. Representative Largent
captured the lurking concern:
Quite simply, the legal ramifications of what the State court of
Hawaii is about to do cannot be ignored. If the State court in
Hawaii legalizes same-sex marriage, homosexual couples from
other states around the country will fly to Hawaii and marry.
These same couples will then go back to their respective States
and argue that the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution recvuires their home State to recognize their union as
a marriage.
These predictions about the likely behavior of same-sex
couples were not unjustified. Same-sex marriage activists indeed
conceived of this exact scenario as part of the broader strategy to
obtain marriage rights nationwide.87 Oft-cited by members of
Congress in the debate over DOMA was a memo authored by
Evan Wolfson, director of the Marriage Project of the Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, which stated:
Many same-sex couples in and out of Hawaii are likely to take
advantage of what would be a landmark victory. The great
majority of those who travel to Hawaii to marry will return to
their homes in the rest of the country expecting full legal na-
tionwide recognition of their marriage unions.
This "plan" was cited frequently in Congressional debates and
galvanized support for the idea that Hawaii's same-sex marriages
would be immediately and relentlessly thrust upon other states,
and that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would leave states de-
fenseless to the demands.89
86 142 CONG. REC. H7276 (1996) (statement of Rep. Largent). DOMA's senate
sponsor, Senator Nickles, concurred: "[i]t has become clear that advocates of same-
sex unions intend to win in the lawsuit in Hawaii and then invoke the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to force the other 49 states to accept same-sex unions." 142 CONG.
REC. S10100, S10103 (1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
87 Borchers, Baker v. General Motors, supra note 79, at 149-50 ("The Clause was
seized upon almost immediately by advocates of same-sex marriages to argue that if
a same-sex couple were to get married in Hawaii, every other state would have to
treat the couple as married because a marriage is a 'public Act' or 'Record' or 'judi-
cial proceeding."').88 Evan Wolfson, Fighting to Win and Keep the Freedom to Marry: The Legal,
Political, and Cultural Challenges Ahead, NAT'L J. OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 259,
262 (1995), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/gaylaw/issue2/wolfson.html.89 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. H7480, H7484 (1996) (statement of Rep. Sensenbren-
ner). The same argument was made about the impact of Hawaii's marriage laws on
federal law, only there the point was more salient. Since federal statutes and rules
routinely defer to state definitions of "marriage" and "spouse" in assigning federal
burdens and benefits, it might well have been more automatic in some contexts for a
Hawaii same-sex marriage to earn federal, as opposed to interstate, recognition.
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B. Full Faith and Credit and Marriage Laws
Since same-sex marriage never became legal in Hawaii, it is
hard to assess the accuracy of the factual predicate upon which
DOMA was based.9" The legal predicate, however, was at best
exaggerated, at worst a complete fiction. The thrust of DOMA in
congressional rhetoric was to alleviate the ostensibly binding ob-
ligation of states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recog-
nize each other's marriages. Article IV of the Federal
Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceed-
ings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."'" Pursuant to the
second sentence, the "Effects Clause," Congress enacted the Full
Faith and Credit Act, a federal statute designed to implement the
constitutional mandate. The Act provides that acts, records, and
judicial proceedings "shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Pos-
sessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State
... from which they are taken." 92 Technically speaking, DOMA
amended the Full Faith and Credit Act to make clear that same-
sex marriages need not be given any effect under either the
clause or the statute. Of course, the same was almost certainly
true before DOMA.93
Historically speaking, over the long history of variations
among and conflicts between state marriage laws, full faith and
credit principles have never been understood to compel one state
to recognize another's marriages. Indeed, the specter of the
clause has hardly been raised in the context of marriage recogni-
tion. One explanation for this is that the Supreme Court has re-
served the "exacting" obligations of full faith and credit for final
judgments in judicial proceedings.94 Historical conflicts over mi-
90 Even though Massachusetts has since legalized same-sex marriage, the behavior
patterns of same-sex couples still cannot be measured because Massachusetts has
refused to issue marriage licenses to non-residents under its marriage evasion law.
See infra text accompanying note 246.
91 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
92 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
93 See, e.g., Borchers, Baker v. General Motors, supra note 79, at 180 ("To the
extent that DOMA provides that states are under no constitutional obligation to
recognize a marriage license issued by another state to a same-sex couple, it is an
utterly unremarkable statute. In fact, it was utterly unnecessary.").
94 See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998); see also
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gratory divorce, perennially more hard-fought and contentious
than conflicts over evasive marriage, ground to a halt, in fact,
through the Supreme Court's insistence on these "exacting" obli-
gations. The Court held, in its 1942 decision in Williams v. North
Carolina,9' that states were compelled to recognize divorces
from every state, provided certain minimal due process require-
ments were met.96 But marriage, unlike divorce, is neither a
judgment nor the product of a judicial proceeding.
For state law not embodied in judgments, full faith and credit
principles set only "certain minimum requirements which each
state must observe when asked to apply the law of a sister
state."97 The minimum requirements, discussed in detail below,
are simply that a state may choose not to defer to another state's
law as long as it has "a significant contact or significant aggrega-
tion of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 98 An alterna-
tive explanation for the lack of full faith and credit analysis in
questions of marriage recognition is that marriage is not an "act"
within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in which
case even those minimum requirements do not apply.99
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234 (1908) (requiring Mississippi to give full faith
and credit to a Missouri judgment to enforce a futures contract despite a Mississippi
statute declaring that such a contract "shall not be enforced by any court").
95 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams I) (ruling that North Carolina must recognize a
divorce granted by a Nevada court to two North Carolina residents).
96 See id. at 319. The court's original ruling was softened some by a later ruling in
the same case, which allowed North Carolina to make its own determination as to
whether Nevada's jurisdictional requirements had been met. See Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945) (Williams II). The force of Williams I was further
undermined by Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), a case in which the Court held
that while a New York court had to honor a Nevada divorce with respect to deter-
mining the marital status of the parties, it did not have to relieve the plaintiff-hus-
band from the incidental obligations of separation previously adjudicated by a New
York court.
97 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953).
98 Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)); see also Williams I, 317 U.S. at 298 (princi-
ples of full faith and credit "do[ ] not require one state to substitute for its own
statute ... the conflicting statutes of another state, even though that statute is of
controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to the same
persons and events") (quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939)); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,
436 (1943) ("[E]ach of the states of the Union has constitutional authority to make
its own law with respect to persons and events within its borders."); Phillips Petro-
leum, 472 U.S. at 823 ("[I]n many situations a state court may be free to apply one
of several choices of law.").
99 See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act. Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on
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Regardless of the explanation, the historical practice and pre-
cedent for over 200 years has been to decide questions of mar-
riage recognition without invoking full faith and credit principles
to supply the answer.1 °° Courts instead have applied either gen-
eral principles of comity or specific conflict of laws principles to
determine whether to grant or refuse recognition to a prohibited
out-of-state marriage. 10 1 The fact that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has not been invoked in the marriage context does not
mean that it could not be. It might be, as Justice Robert Jackson
speculated in a 1945 address, that "[g]enerosity in applying for-
eign law no doubt has forestalled pursuit of many questions as
constitutional ones under the full faith and credit clause.' 0 2
Indeed, much paper has been devoted to the subject in the last
decade, but most scholars agree, as a matter of constitutional the-
ory and interpretation, that states are not compelled under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to honor a marriage that under-
mines a strong public policy of the state.'03 Although states must
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 42-43 (1996) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1740] (statement
of Cass R. Sunstein, Professor of Law, University of Chicago) (considering various
explanations for the prior lack of application of full faith and credit principles to
marriages). But see ROBERT H. JACKSON, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE LAWYER'S
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1945) (noting that the "Constitution by use of
the term 'public acts' clearly includes statutes"). One issue never addressed in the
debate over DOMA is the possibility that foreign countries might recognize same-
sex marriages as well. Full faith and credit principles clearly do not apply to such
marriages. See Kramer, supra note 79, at 1987-90; Kay, supra note 59, at 74 (noting
that states are "free to grant or deny recognition to foreign country same-sex mar-
riages simply by invoking its local public policy on a case-by-case basis without fear
of contrary direction from the Full Faith and Credit Clause").
100 Cf JACKSON, supra note 99, at 23 (noting that "[qjuestions of faith and credit
in matrimonial relations have usually come up only as to the effect of judgments").
Exceptions to this characterization are virtually nonexistent, and cases that do in-
voke full faith and credit principles with respect to marriage recognition tend to do
so without analysis. See, e.g., Wyble v. Minivielle, 217 So. 2d 684, 688 (Ct. App. La.
1969) ("Louisiana does not recognize or permit the contracting of commonlaw mar-
riages in this state, but we are obliged to give effect to such marriages when they are
validly contracted in another state. This is commanded by the full faith and credit
clause ....")
101 See infra text accompanying notes 134-86 (detailing historical approach to
marriage recognition).
102 JACKSON, supra note 99, at 30; see also id. at 29-30 ("The states themselves
have sought in general to attain a greater measure of uniformity in private law than
Congress or the federal courts have sought to impose.").
103 See generally Koppelman, supra note 61 (arguing that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not mandate recognition of out-of-state marriages in all circum-
stances); F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561, 603-06 (2005) (arguing that the Constitution does not
restrain the right of a state to refuse enforcement to a marriage celebrated else-
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honor divorces they abhor, because of the strict approach to full
faith and credit in the context of judgments, they need not neces-
sarily honor states' laws, or the marriages those laws permit.
Assuming a particular marriage ban is not itself unconstitu-
tional, °4 courts have thought themselves free to refuse recogni-
tion to an out-of-state marriage if necessary to protect a state's
strong public policy. 105 Indeed, one of the first appellate cases
brought seeking out-of-state recognition of a Vermont civil
union, Rosengarten v. Downes,1°6 followed this approach. The
Rosengarten court considered but rejected the plaintiff's claim
that his Vermont civil union status must be granted full faith and
credit by Connecticut courts. 10 7 The court interpreted Article IV
to require recognition only if consistent with the "forum's own
interest in furthering its public policy."'01 8 A federal court in
Florida rejected a similar claim, made in reference to a Massa-
chusetts marriage."'
where); Borchers, Essential Irrelevance, supra note 79 (arguing that full faith and
credit principles do not require states to recognize marriages from other states); Jef-
frey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant
View of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409 (1998);
Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of
Obligation, 1 STANFORD J. OF Civ. RIGHTS & Civ. LIBERTIES 32 (forthcoming
2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=697862 (not-
ing that it is "a hard case to make under conventional principles of constitutional
law" that one state must recognize a same-sex marriage from another state). The
irrelevance of full faith and credit to marriage recognition questions is currently be-
ing pressed in a case before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court challenging
the validity of the state's marriage evasion law. See Brief as Amici Curiae of Profes-
sors of Conflict of Laws and Family Law, Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
No. SJC-09436 (Mass. Mar. 11, 2005).
104 A state could not, for example, refuse recognition today to an interracial mar-
riage on grounds of a public policy against it because such a policy would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Likewise, were
the Supreme Court to hold bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, a state
could not refuse recognition to them either.
105 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 113a (8th
ed. 1883) (noting the power of states to refuse recognition for marriages "positively
prohibited by the public law of a country from motives of policy"); see generally
GEORGE W. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CoNFLICr OF LAWS 262 (1937) ("[M]ost
courts have felt free to hold a marriage invalid when it runs counter to what is re-
garded as a particularly strong policy at the domiciliary forum.").
106 802 A.2d 170, 174-75 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
107 Id. at 179.
10 8 Id. at 178.
109 See Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (rejecting full
faith and credit claim). The trial court in Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 765
N.Y.S.2d 411, 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), rev'd, No. 2003-04702, slip op. (N.Y. App.
Div. Oct. 11, 2005), discussed infra notes 248-55, refers to "full faith and credit and
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Although a federal court recently invalidated Nebraska's mini-
DOMA, it did so on grounds unrelated to full faith and credit.
The Court in Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning,"1
held that the state's broad constitutional amendment, which ref-
uses recognition to a same-sex relationship in any form, violated
the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Bill
of Attainder Clause.111 Had the provision merely refused recog-
nition to same-sex marriages elsewhere, the opinion implies such
a provision would have been found valid.112
Why did something essentially irrelevant to the issue of mar-
riage recognition become the focal point of the debate? Voices
on the floor of Congress did raise the point that full faith and
credit has never been instrumental to marriage recognition cases.
Representative Nadler, for example, pointed out that states tra-
ditionally possessed the ability to refuse recognition to certain
out-of-state marriages, and decried DOMA as "a fraud on the
American people" for suggesting otherwise. 13 Others argued
that if the Full Faith and Credit Clause does apply to marriage,
then DOMA is unconstitutional since Congress does not have
the power unilaterally to amend a provision of the constitution.
And if it does not apply, these same commentators argued, the
statute accomplishes nothing. Representative Studds suggested,
for example, that DOMA is: "absolutely meaningless. Either
under the Constitution the States already have that right, in
which case we do nothing, or they do not, in which case we can-
not do anything because it is a constitutional provision. '"1 14
Noted constitutional law scholar Cass Sunstein agreed, testifying
that DOMA is "probably either pointless or unconstitutional." '115
comity" as the justifications for recognizing a Vermont civil union. But nothing in
the reasoning or citations suggests that the clause itself was being invoked to compel
recognition. Likewise, a trial court in Massachusetts has suggested in dicta that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause might require states to recognize out-of-state marriages
unless they have a strong public policy against the union. But since the court was
weighing recognition of a civil union rather than a marriage, it refused to apply those
principles. Salucco v. Alldredge, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 498 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004)
(mem.).
110 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005).
111 Id. at 989, 1005.
112 Id. at 1008.
113 142 CONG. REc. H7276 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
114 142 CONG. REc. H7277 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Studds).
115 Hearing on S. 1740, supra note 99, at 44 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
Much of the discussion of DOMA had this flavor. As Professor Patrick Borchers
describes the debate about DOMA: "[i]ts proponents alternately claimed that it
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He described the scenario in which couples from all over the
country would fly to Hawaii, fly home and successfully demand
recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause as "unlikely,
for the full faith and credit clause has never been understood to
bind the states in this way.""' 6 Constitutional law expert Lau-
rence Tribe also noted that, with respect to marriages that had
traditionally been denied recognition, "the proposed federal leg-
islation would be entirely redundant and indeed altogether de-
void of content."'' 17
Other academics testifying before Congress expressed similar
views-that states would not in fact be required to recognize
marriages under full faith and credit principles, particularly if the
state had a significant stake in the relationship and a strong pub-
lic policy against the particular union. Professor Lynn Wardle,
for example, testified that a "state constitutionally could refuse
to recognize the same-sex marriage if it chose to do so, or it could
recognize the same-sex marriage, if it chose to do so. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause would not compel the state either
way.""' 8 Wardle was concerned that gay married couples would
seek to compel recognition under principles of full faith and
credit, but he did not believe they would succeed." 9 Noted con-
flicts and family law scholar Herma Hill Kay submitted a letter to
Senator Dianne Feinstein stating that the "usual conflict of laws
doctrine governing the recognition of a marriage performed in
another state is that the state where recognition is sought need
not recognize a marriage that would violate its public policy."'120
The irrelevance of full faith and credit was brushed to the side,
would do nothing and that it would do something. Its opponents alternately claimed
that it would do nothing and that it would do something." Borchers, Baker v. Gen-
eral Motors, supra note 79, at 179-80 (citations omitted).
116 Hearing on S. 1740, supra note 99, at 44 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein). Sun-
stein argued that states have always had exceptions to a general policy of recogni-
tion, and "[tihere is no Supreme Court ruling to the effect that this view violates the
full faith and credit clause." See id. at 45.
117 142 CONG. REc. S5931 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy,
quoting a letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard
Law School).
118 Hearing on H.R. 3396, supra note 65, at 179 (statement of Lynn D. Wardle)
(testifying that it would not "violate... the Constitution for a second state to refuse
to recognize a same-sex marriage legalized in Hawaii when the second state has a
strong public policy against same-sex marriage")
119 See id.
120 142 CONG. REC. S10100, S10102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy, quoting letter from Herma Hill Kay).
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however, and DOMA was signed into law by a ready-and-waiting
President Clinton fewer than four months after it had first been
introduced. 21
Beyond DOMA, the purported threat posed by full faith and
credit principles has played other roles in legislative and public
policy debates. The fear of a domino effect was renewed in 2003
when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in its Good-
ridge decision, gave the legislature 180 days to make same-sex
marriage available in the state. President Bush reiterated calls
for an amendment to the Federal Constitution to ban same-sex
marriage and, in doing so, alluded to the full faith and credit
problem. 122
The Senate thus introduced and debated the Federal Marriage
Amendment (FMA), which provided that:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of
a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the consti-
tution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union
other than the union of a man and a woman.
Part of the justification for the proposed Amendment was the
possibility that DOMA might be declared unconstitutional. 24
Were that to happen, its supporters argued, then states would,
once again, be compelled by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
recognize a same-sex marriage licensed by a sister state. The
FMA, if enacted, would avoid the full faith and credit questions
raised by a state like Massachusetts by forcing it to reverse
course. If no state can constitutionally legalize same-sex mar-
riages, then no state is put in the position of being compelled to
recognize them. Thus, once again, the focus of Senate debate
was about the full faith and credit implications of states legalizing
same-sex marriage, complicated by the purported likelihood that
121 See 104 Bill Tracking H.R. 3396.
122 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President: President
Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html (calling for a
constitutional amendment at least in part to prevent full faith and credit principles
from mandating recognition of same-sex marriages by states other than
Massachusetts).
123 Federal Marriage Amendment, S.J. Res. 40,108th Cong. (2004) (introduced by
Sen. Allard).
124 See, e.g., 150 CONG. REc. S7871, S7872 (daily ed. July 7, 2004) (statement by
Sen. Allard) (noting concern about uncontrollable "activist judges").
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DOMA might someday be invalidated.125
But since the FMA has yet to make any substantial progress
towards enactment,126 same-sex marriage opponents have sought
other means to insulate states from compelled recognition of
Massachusetts' marriages. The House of Representatives passed
the Marriage Protection Act (MPA) shortly after the FMA failed
to reach a vote in the Senate in July 2004. If enacted into law,
the MPA would strip federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, of jurisdiction to hear any case relating to DOMA or the
MPA itself.127 As with DOMA, the factual predicate for the
MPA is not implausible. Couples will, and indeed already
have,128 challenged the validity of DOMA and its state analogs
on full faith and credit grounds. 129
The legal predicate-that DOMA could be declared invalid-
125 See 150 CONG. REC. S7903, S7925 (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Brownback) ("Federal judges will likely rule DOMA unconstitutional under the
doctrine of full faith and credit, and marriages recognized in one State will be re-
quired to be recognized in all."); id. at S7925 (statement of Sen. Santorum); see also
Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Un-
constitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997).
126 Cf President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 2005 (Feb. 2,
2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.
html ("I support a constitutional amendment to protect the institution of
marriage.").
127 The MPA specifically provides: "No court created by Act of Congress shall
have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to
hear or determine any question pertaining to the interpretation of section 1738C of
this title or of this section." Marriage Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 3313, 108th
Cong. (2003). The MPA passed the House by a vote of 233-194,150 CONG. REC.
H6580, 6612 (daily ed. July 22, 2004), but was never introduced in the Senate.
128 Until Massachusetts began to permit same-sex couples to marry, no one had
standing to challenge DOMA. Thus, to date, only a handful of cases have been filed.
129 Plaintiffs in the first such case filed a complaint in Florida seeking a declara-
tion that the federal Defense of Marriage Act and the Florida law prohibiting recog-
nition of same-sex marriages are both invalid. Among other claims, the plaintiffs
alleged that the federal and state laws precluding recognition of their marriage vio-
lated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution: "[O]nce Massa-
chusetts sanctioned legal same-gender marriage, all other states should be
constitutionally required to uphold the validity of the marriage." Wilson v. Ake, 354
F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla 2005) (quoting plaintiffs' complaint). Plaintiffs in
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), made a similar argument
when asking a court in Indiana to recognize their Vermont civil union. On appeal,
however, plaintiffs dropped their recognition claim, see id. at 19 n.2, and challenged
only the validity under the Indiana constitution of the state statutes prohibiting them
from entering into a same-sex marriage in Indiana. Cf. Cook v. Cook, 104 P.3d 857,
863 n.6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (deeming full faith and credit argument waived on
appeal in case testing the validity of a prohibited first-cousin marriage from out of
state).
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is also not implausible. Some scholars have argued that DOMA
is invalid because it exceeds Congress' authority under the Full
Faith and Credit Act, 3 ° or, more persuasively, because it violates
principles of due process and equal protection guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution.13 ' But even without DOMA, the underly-
ing full faith and credit principles are still unlikely, for the rea-
sons discussed above, to come into play.
III
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO MARRIAGE
RECOGNITION: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMITY
In reacting to the threat of same-sex marriage, states protected
themselves from a hypothetical risk of compelled recognition,
but at a substantial cost. Most states also lost the ability to grant
recognition in individual cases, something they were much more
inclined to do historically than to refuse it. The rush to judgment
by Congress and the states preempted a full and fair discussion
not only about the proper role, if any, of full faith and credit
principles, but also about how states ought to approach the mar-
riage recognition questions raised by the legalization of same-sex
marriage in one or more jurisdictions. This section considers the
traditional treatment of marriage recognition by American
courts, state legislatures, and in the secondary literature.
A. The General Rule of Recognition
Varied marriage laws gave rise to predictable conflicts about
the portability of marriage.132 The principle of comity-"cour-
130 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 79, at 1987-90 (arguing that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not permit states to reject laws of other states since "[t]he central
object of the Clause was, in fact, to eliminate a state's prideful unwillingness to rec-
ognize other states' laws or judgments on the ground that these are inferior or unac-
ceptable"); cf. Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry
in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033,
1041 (arguing that states are constitutionally obligated to honor same-sex marriages
because validation serves the "better rule of law"). On the meaning of the Effects
Clause, see generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial
States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249
(1992).
131 See, e.g., Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground
for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684 (2004) (arguing that DOMA vio-
lates both equal protection and due process guarantees contained in the Federal
Constitution).
. 132 See JOSEPH R. LONG, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 85 (1905) ("Every nation
and every state and territory of the Union have their own peculiar laws regulating
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tesy among political entities"' "-was the historical touchstone
for analyzing marriage recognition questions.'34 All jurisdictions
followed some version of lex loci contractus in evaluating the va-
lidity of a marriage.35 Under this general rule, often referred to
as the "place of celebration" rule, a marriage was valid every-
where if valid where celebrated,'136 and, concomitantly, void eve-
rywhere if void where celebrated.1 37 It was, according to a 1902
treatise on domestic relations, "the universal practice of civilized
nations [that] the permission or prohibition of particular mar-
riages, of right belongs to the country where the marriage is to be
celebrated.' 1 38 Enforcement of this general rule was called for
by "public policy, common morality, and the comity of
nations.'
13 9
B. Exceptions to the General Rule of Recognition
While the place-of-celebration rule generally meant that out-
of-state marriages would be recognized, even if they could not
this important institution, and the differences in these laws have given rise to many
cases in conflict of laws."); JAMES SCHOULER, LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 46
(2d ed. 1874) ("In England, such cases do not often come before the courts; but with
us they are very common, the more so as each State adopts its own system concern-
ing marriage and divorce.").
13 3 See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 174 (2d
ed. 1995).
134 See, e.g., SCHOULER, supra note 132, at 47 (describing the rule of recognition
as "the rule of comity").
135 This rule originated with Joseph Story, who stated in his treatise on conflicts
that "[t]he general principle certainly is... that ... marriage is to be decided by the
law of the place where it is celebrated." See STORY, supra note 105, § 113.
136 See, e.g., IRVING BROWNE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
AND OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYED 12 (2d ed., rev. 1890); LONG, supra note 132, at
86 ("A marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, and, conversely, a mar-
riage invalid where celebrated is invalid everywhere."); MORLAND, supra note 14, at
16 n.59 (collecting state cases reflecting the place of celebration rule); WALTER C.
TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 45
(1896) ("It is well settled that, as a general rule, the validity of a marriage is to be
determined by the law of the place where it is entered into .... ").
137 See, e.g., JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE 307 (6th ed., rev. 1881) (stating that "if the transaction is not
regarded by the law there prevailing as a marriage, it will not be deemed such in any
other country"); SCHOULER, supra note 132, at 49 ("A marriage invalid where cele-
brated is as a rule invalid everywhere.").
138 FLETCHER W. BATTERSHALL, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 7-8 (1902) (describing prevalence of general rule of
recognition).
139 See SCHOULER, supra note 132, at 47.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
have been contracted within the forum state, there were certain
well-established exceptions.
1. Categorical Exceptions
The first categorical exception to the rule of recognition, the
so-called "universal" exception, was reserved for marriages
thought to violate natural law.1 4 1 Polygamous and certain inces-
tuous marriages fell into that category,1 41 though not all incestu-
ous marriages fit the bill.142 According to one 1896 treatise, "no
court in this country would uphold . . . an incestuous marriage
between brother and sister, though they might be valid in the
country in which they were entered into. ' 143 Marriages between
ancestor and descendant were also universally taboo.144 Since all
states prohibited this narrower class of incestuous marriages,
there were few if any cases refusing recognition to a marriage on
those grounds. 145 The incest cases that did arise tended to in-
volve uncle-niece or cousin marriages, which were arguably justi-
fiable either because religious law permitted them146 or because,
140 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Graham, 31 N.E. 706, 707 (Mass. 1892) (citing as
an exception to the general rule of recognition a marriage "deemed contrary to the
law of nature, as generally recognized in Christian countries"); TIFFANY, supra note
136, at 46 (stating that marriages will not be recognized by a state if it is "opposed to
the morality, religion, or municipal institutions").
141 See LONG, supra note 132, at 87 (noting an exception for "marriages repug-
nant to the moral sense of Christendom, of which the only recognized examples are
polygamous and incestuous marriages"); MORLAND, supra note 14, at 20 (noting
that polygamous and "incestuous or unnatural marriages" will "not be upheld"); see
also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 74 (1968) (noting the exception to the place of celebration rule if they were
"incestuous according to the general consent of all Christendom").
142 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 464 (1873) (noting with ap-
proval a prior Massachusetts case recognizing an English marriage between aunt and
nephew on the principle that the place of celebration rule should still apply to "mar-
riages not naturally unlawful, but prohibited by the law of one state, and not of
another").
143 See LONG, supra note 132, at 88 (noting that the exception for incestuous mar-
riages "includes only persons in the direct line of consanguinity and brothers and
sisters"); TIFFANY, supra note 136, at 46.
144 See P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected
by Policy in Respect of Incestuous Marriages, 117 A.L.R. 186, 190 (1938) (noting that
the incest exception includes direct line ancestors and descendants and brothers and
sisters).
145 See id. at 187 ("No case has been found, decided in the United States, in which
nonrecognition of a marriage valid by the lex loci, but made incestuous by the local
law of the state in which its validity is brought into question .... ").
146 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-415-4 (1938) (creating exception for certain pro-
hibited marriages for any "which shall be solemnized among the Jews, within the
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although prohibited, they were not abhorrent because of the rel-
ative distance of the relation. 47
With respect to polygamous marriages, the main issue was
whether to recognize potentially polygamous unions-a first
marriage celebrated under laws that would permit subsequent
ones-or only marriages that were in fact polygamous. There
were few cases testing the principle, but those few suggest that
only actual polygamy fell within the exception. 4 8 Some courts
and commentators also considered marriage by an "imbecile" to
be within the natural law exception.149 Despite the vehement op-
position to interracial marriages, 150 however, they were seldom
considered to fall in this category.151
The second categorical exception to the place-of-celebration
rule involved legislative enactments specifically declaring certain
marriages invalid or void as against public policy. 5 a This positive
degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion"). The New York
Court of Appeals, in In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953), refused to
apply the universal incest exception to an uncle-niece marriage validly celebrated
under this Rhode Island statute since it "was not offensive to the public sense of
morality to a degree regarded generally with abhorrence and thus was not within the
inhibitions of natural law."
147 See, e.g., Etheridge v. Shaddock, 706 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ark. 1986) (upholding
evasive first-cousin marriage celebrated in Texas); Staley v. State, 131 N.W. 1028,
1029-30 (Neb. 1911) (permitting man to be charged with bigamy even though first
"marriage" was to first cousin in violation of domicile law); Mazzolini v. Mazzolini,
155 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ohio 1958) (recognizing marriage of first cousins prohibited in
Ohio, but celebrated in Massachusetts).
148 See P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected
by the Conditions or Manner of Dissolving it Under the Foreign Law, or the Tolera-
tion of Polygamous Marriages, 74 A.L.R. 1533, 1534-35 (1931).
149 See, e.g., True v. Ranney, 21 N.H. 52, 56 (1850) (refusing to apply place of
celebration rule to recognize marriage by an imbecile); SCHOULER, supra note 132,
at 48 (noting an exception to the place of celebration rule for "marriages of such as
are mentally and physically incapable"); TIFFANY, supra note 136, at 46 ("Nor will
the lex loci prevail if it recognizes as valid a marriage entered into by an imbecile.").
150 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Same-sex Marriage and Public Policy: The
Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 105 (1996).
151 See, e.g., Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 161 (1819) (distinguishing inter-
racial marriages, which were prohibited by the Massachusetts code, from other pro-
hibited marriages that "would tend to outrage the principles and feelings of all
civilized nations"); cf VERNIER, supra note 11, § 44, at 204-05 ("The peculiarly geo-
graphic distribution of statutes prohibiting racial intermarriage forces one to con-
clude . . . that such legislation is not based primarily upon physiological,
psychological, or other scientific bases, but is for the most part the product of local
prejudice and of local effort to protect the social and economic standards of the
white race.").
152 See, e.g., BArERSHALL, supra note 138, at 17; LONG, supra note 132, at 88-89
(noting exception for "marriages which have been declared by statute to be void
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law exception provides the origin for the notion of a "public pol-
icy exception" to marriage recognition. 153 As conventionally un-
derstood, it referred to a public policy expressly declared by
statute, as opposed to a general public policy of the state. Courts
and legislatures tended to agree that such an exception should be
recognized, but states disagreed, predictably, as to which mar-
riages were sufficiently odious to violate public policy. 154
The most common application of this exception concerned
evasive marriages-where citizens defy their own state's restric-
tions by going elsewhere to marry and then returning home.
(Evasive marriages exist because states have traditionally not im-
posed a residency requirement on marriage as they have on di-
vorce.) As one court noted, a state "has the power to declare
that marriages between its own citizens contrary to its established
public policy shall have no validity in its courts, even though they
be celebrated in other states, under whose laws they would ordi-
narily be valid."' 55 All states agreed that "where the statute ex-
pressly declares that a marriage contracted in another state in
evasion of its prohibitions shall be void with the same effect as
though contracted in the state of domicile, such marriage will be
because contrary to the public policy of the state"); MORLAND, supra note 14, at 20
(noting, as an exception to the place of celebration rule, "[m]arriages which the leg-
islature of a state has declared shall not be allowed any validity because they are
contrary to the policy of its law"); see also Commonwealth v. Graham, 31 N.E. 706,
707 (Mass. 1892) (noting an exception to the place of celebration rule if the state
"statutes declare such a marriage void"); Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18
(1881); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132(d) (1934) (permitting
refusal of recognition for the "marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domi-
cil makes void even though celebrated in another state").
153 It is often described as an exception to full faith and credit for marriages, but,
within this particular context, it is better understood as an exception to the general
common law principles of recognition.
154 See, e.g., LONG, supra note 132, at 89 n.10 (noting that northern states might
be more inclined to validate a prohibited interracial marriage because of the fewer
numbers of them, while a southern state might form a public policy against recogni-
tion because of the greater threat).
155 Lanham v. Lanham, 117 N.W. 787, 788 (Wis. 1908) (emphasis added); see also
Wilson v. Cook, 100 N.E. 222 (Ill. 1912) ("[W]here a state has enacted a statute
lawfully imposing upon its citizens an incapacity to contract marriage by reason of a
positive policy of the state for the protection of the morals and good order of society
against serious social evils, a marriage contracted in disregard of the prohibition of
the statute, wherever celebrated, will be void."); see also MORLAND, supra note 14,
at 18 ("When persons residing in one state, in order to evade the statutes as to
prohibited marriages, and with the intention of returning to reside in that state, go
into another state and there have the marriage solemnized and afterwards return to
and reside in the original state, the marriage is void and may be annulled.").
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held void by the courts.' '1 56
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act (UMEA), promulgated in
1912, dealt, as the title implies, solely with evasive marriages.
157
Certain marriage impediments were uniform across the United
States and thus could not be avoided simply by crossing state
lines. The uniform law was thus not concerned with "marriages
against the law of nature," but rather with marriages "against the
public policy of any state. ' 15 8 By way of example, the NCCUSL
Commissioners mentioned marriage "with particeps criminis, or
with a minor without parental consent, or within a specified time
after entry of final decree in divorce, or between a white and a
colored person" as restrictions that might produce an evasive
marriage elsewhere. 59 The evasion statute was designed to "give
full effect to the prohibitory laws of each state by making void all
marriages contracted in violation of such prohibitions.' 160 Five
states adopted the UMEA,'16' but several others adhered to its
principles either in an alternative statutory form or through case
law. 1
62
For non-evasive marriages, though, states disagreed about the
applicability of the positive law exception to specific prohibited
marriages. None took the position that a mere statutory prohibi-
tion of a particular type of marriage meant that a court could not
grant recognition to the same type of marriage if it was validly
celebrated elsewhere. As Joseph Vernier wrote in 1931,
"[m]arriages are prohibited for many reasons but are void for
156 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 127 (1912) (annotation to UMEA § 1) [hereinaf-
ter 1912 PROCEEDINGS]; see also LONG, supra note 132, at 91 (noting the view of
some courts that an evasive marriage is invalid only if there is a state law expressly
providing for that treatment).
157 See 1912 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 156, at 127 (annotation to UMEA § 1).
Evasion laws differed in whether they required both parties to be behaving eva-
sively, or only one. NCCUSL opted for a law invalidating a marriage if either party
was evading his or her home state's laws. See id.
158 Id.
159 See id. at 127-28.
160 Id. at 128.
161 See 9 U.L.A. at 224, 225 (1923) (noting adoption of UMEA by Illinois, Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Vermont, Wisconsin); see also 1994 HANDBOOK, supra note 31,
at 1351 tbl.IV (noting that UMEA was withdrawn in 1943 and superseded by § 210
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of 1970).
162 See, e.g., VERNIER, supra note 11, § 45 (listing eighteen jurisdictions with mar-
riage evasion laws on the books in 1931); Koppelman, supra note 61, at 923 n.2
(collecting modern evasion statutes).
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few." '16 3 To invoke this exception, courts generally required
"clear and unmistakable expression in the statute" of the legisla-
ture's intent to deny recognition to the particular category of
marriages. 164 But a split developed as to whether a law declaring
a particular type of marriage to be "void" was sufficient to bring
it within the exception, or whether the law expressly had to es-
tablish a rule of non-recognition. An early English case took the
former view, 165 and several states followed suit. 166 But others de-
parted from the English approach and required express language
directly addressing the recognition question before refusing to
acknowledge an out-of-state marriage.167  As the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed in 1953:
We regard the law as settled that, subject to two exceptions
presently to be considered, and in the absence of a statute ex-
pressly regulating within the domiciliary State marriages solem-
nized abroad, the legality of a marriage between persons... is
to be determined by the law of the place where it is
celebrated. 6 8
163 VERNIER, supra note 11, § 45, at 210.
164 See, e.g., In re Loughmiller's Estate, 629 P.2d 156, 161 (Kan. 1981) (granting
recognition to evasive first-cousin marriage since Kansas statute did not expressly
address applicability of its prohibition to out-of-state marriages); State v. Hand, 126
N.W. 1002, 1002-03 (Neb. 1910) (intent to preclude recognition "cannot be in-
ferred"); Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 309 (Tenn. 1899) ("It is not always easy to
determine what is a positive state policy," since not every provision "of a statute
prohibiting marriage, under certain circumstances, or between certain parties, is in-
dicative of a state policy" for recognition purposes.); Lanham v. Lanham, 117 N.W.
787, 788 (Wis. 1908) (observing that when a state gives it laws "extraterritorial ef-
fect" by refusing to recognize marriages from elsewhere, the "intention to give such
effect must, however, be quite clear.").
165 Brook v. Brook, 9 H.L. Cas. 193 (1861); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE EVASION
Acr, 9 U.L.A. 225 (1923) (withdrawn 1943) (annotation) (noting that the English
rule was followed in California, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania
and Tennessee).
166 See, e.g., Laikola v. Engineered Concrete, 277 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn. 1979)
(observing that a statute's declaring a marriage "void" is sufficient to preclude rec-
ognition of such a marriage from another jurisdiction under the public policy excep-
tion); Maurer v. Maurer, 60 A.2d 440 (Pa. 1948) (refusing to recognize evasive
marriage in violation of lifetime remarriage restriction even though Pennsylvania
law did not address extraterritorial effect by statute).
167 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873); In re Miller's Estate,
214 N.W. 428 (Mich. 1927) (finding statutory declaration that first-cousin marriages
were "void" insufficient to preclude recognition); Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y.
18 (1881).
168 In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953) (emphasis added); cf. Catalano
v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726 (Conn. 1961) (refusing recognition to non-evasive, uncle-
niece marriage under statute interpreted to mean that foreign marriage could only
be recognized if it could have been contracted in Connecticut).
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The latter approach diminished the scope of the positive law
exception considerably. Most state codes did not explicitly ad-
dress the proper treatment of prohibited marriages solemnized
elsewhere and thus could not effectively block recognition of the
marriages prohibited within their own borders. The Arizona
Code in 1939, for example, stated that the "marriage of a person
of Caucasion blood with a Negro, Mongolian, Malay, or Hindu
shall be null and void" and that a "marriage may not be con-
tracted by agreement without marriage ceremony."'16 9 Prohibit-
ing both interracial and common law marriages was not unusual
for the time, but it was far from universal. Yet Arizona, which
prohibited both, had no statute declaring that it would refuse to
recognize either such marriage from another state.
2. Semi-Categorical Exceptions
In addition to the categorical exceptions, other patterns of rec-
ognition were discernible. Evasive marriage behavior was often
relevant to these patterns, even in the absence of an express anti-
evasion statute that would bring it within the positive law excep-
tion discussed above. Interracial marriages, for example, were
often denied recognition if they were evasive in character, but
validated if they were non-evasive, even though in both cases the
marriage was expressly prohibited by the destination state's mar-
riage law. 170 The two North Carolina cases discussed above are
indicative of this compromise. 17
1
But this approach was not universal, and even evasive interra-
cial marriages were sometimes upheld. The leading case for this
169 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 63-107, 63-111 (1939); see also STATUTES OF ALL STATES
AND TERRITORIES WITH ANNOTATIONS ON MARRIAGE - ANNULMENT - DIVORCE
23-24 (Frank J. Indovina & John E. Dalton eds., 1945).
170 See P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected
by Local Miscegenation Law, 3 A.L.R.2d 240, 242 (1949) ("[B]y the great weight of
authority an intermarriage between races prohibited by the law of the domicil of the
parties at the time of its celebration in another state in which it was valid, in evasion
of the law of their domicil, the parties intending to return and having returned to
their original domicil, will not be recognized there, but will be treated as void the
same as if it were contracted in the state."); see also MORLAND, supra note 14, at 18-
19.
171 See State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877); State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877).
On the strength of state public policies against interracial marriage, see Koppelman,
supra note 150, at 109; see also Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-
Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143,
2151 (2005) (noting the existence of criminal penalties for miscegenation in many
states).
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view was Medway v. Needham, an 1819 case in which the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a marriage even
though the parties had left their home state of Massachusetts
specifically to avoid its anti-miscegenation law and then returned
immediately after marrying in neighboring Rhode Island.'72
While many courts and commentators criticized this ruling, some
expressly approved and followed it. 173 One nineteenth-century
treatise noted, for example, that:
It has even been held, in most states, that where the parties go
out of the state in which they live, for the purpose of evading
its laws... the marriage will not be held invalid on their return
into the state, if it is valid in the state or country in which it
took place .... 174
Other types of marriages met with an even greater likelihood
of recognition. Common law marriages were routinely recog-
nized in states that prohibited them by statute. 75 Exceptions to
this general approach existed in some jurisdictions for evasive
common law marriages, 76 and several jurisdictions refused rec-
ognition if the marriage was formed through short-term or tran-
sient contacts with the validating state. 177 But, in general, states
172 See, e.g., 16 Mass. 157, 159 (1819) (concluding that a marriage would be recog-
nized if lawful where solemnized "even when it appears that the parties went into
another state to evade the laws of their own country").
173 See, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson, 51 'Cal. 120, 125 (1875) (recognizing interracial
marriage celebrated in Utah despite California statute declaring such marriage a
nullity if performed there).1 74 TIFFANY, supra note 136, at 45; see also SCHOULER, supra note 132, at 47
("Even when parties leave their own State or country, for the express purpose of
evading the legal requirements, marry abroad, and then return, the marriage is to be
sustained.").0
175 See, e.g., Mission Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 559 P.2d 1085 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1976) (non-evasive common law marriage contracted in Kansas valid in Arizona);
Doyle v. Doyle, 497 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (recognizing common law mar-
riage contracted in Kansas despite statutory prohibition in Missouri); Mott v.
Duncan Petroleum Trans., 414 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 1980) (recognizing common law
marriage contracted in Georgia).
176 See, e.g., Grant v. Superior Ct., 555 P.2d 895, 897 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (noting
that place-of-celebration rule would apply to common law marriages unless they
were evasive). Contrary to popular conceptions of common law marriage, there is
no specified time a relationship must last to qualify. A common law marriage can be
contracted in permitting jurisdictions by simply intentionally acting married for a
brief time; an intentionally "evasive" common law marriage is thus possible.
177 See, e.g., Lynch v. Bowen, 681 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. I11. 1988); Etienne v. DKM
Enterprises, 136 Cal. App. 3d 487 (1982) (refusing to recognize common law mar-
riage contracted during brief visits to Texas despite a California statute expressly
stating that a common law marriage validly contracted elsewhere is valid in Califor-
nia); Goldin v. Goldin, 426 A.2d 410 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Laikola v. Engi-
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were quite receptive to common law marriages, even though
many of them had abolished the practice by statute for their own
citizens. 178  Remarriages following divorce in violation of the
granting state's restriction were almost always recognized if the
remarriage was contracted in a jurisdiction other than the one
imposing the restriction, 79 unless the restricting state had a stat-
ute specifically ascribing extraterritorial effect to such
restrictions.18 0
For other marriage categories, such as the marriage of a minor
without parental consent or the marriage of two individuals with
a relationship of affinity, the results in recognition questions
were not necessarily susceptible to general rules.181 Across a va-
riety of impediments, the procedural posture in which the recog-
nition question was presented was relevant to the outcome. For
neered Concrete, 277 N.W.2d 653 (Minn. 1979) (refusing to recognize a common law
marriage contracted during transient contacts with another state). But see Albina
Engine & Machine Works v. O'Leary, 328 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that
common law marriage contracted by Oregon residents in Idaho during brief visits to
the state is valid in Oregon).
178 See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985) (describing the rise and fall of common
law marriage in the nineteenth century).
179 See Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 471 (1873) (recognizing remar-
riage from New Hampshire even though husband had been barred from remarrying
for life because of his adultery in a prior marriage); see also Succession of Her-
nandez, 46 La. Ann. 962 (1894); Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18 (1881); State v.
Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403 (1897); Frame v. Thormann, 79 N.W. 39 (Wis. 1899); TIFFANY,
supra note 136, at 46 (noting that remarriage restrictions imposed on parties after a
divorce were "not necessarily ... taken into consideration in another"). But see
Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 309 (Tenn. 1899) (invalidating remarriage in viola-
tion of restriction because of a "distinctive state policy" designed to protect the in-
nocent spouse and avoid a transgression of public decency).
180 LONG, supra note 132, at 95 (noting "every presumption is against the intent of
the legislature to make [such restrictions] operative beyond the limits of the state"
unless "the statute[ ] expressly so provides"); see also Loughran v. Loughran, 292
U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (refusing to give extraterritorial effect to a "mere statutory
prohibition" on remarriage for an adulterer following divorce). Bishop suggests that
if the marriage restriction was temporary, to leave room for an appeal from a di-
vorce decree, then a remarriage might not be honored. BIsHoP, supra note 137, at
306.
181 See, e.g., MORLAND, supra note 14, at 20 (noting that non-age marriages from
a foreign jurisdiction "have been held void in state of domicil"); See also E.H.
Schopler, Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Validity of Marriage Attacked Because
of Nonage, 71 A.L.R.2d 687 (1960) (cataloguing cases decided over the course of
several decades about whether states should recognize marriages that were validly
celebrated in one state but would not have been in the forum state because of
"nonage"); Vartanian, supra note 144 (noting the mixed authorities on the question
of whether to recognize an evasive marriage that was not incestuous in the eyes of
"Christendom" but defined as incestuous by the domiciliaries' state law).
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example, when one party sought to have the out-of-state mar-
riage annulled, the alignment of the party's and state's interest
against recognition often propelled that outcome. The question
of recognition with respect to marriages prohibited because of
non-age was often raised when one party sought to annul an out-
of-state underage union. Courts in such cases tended to deny
recognition (by granting annulments) so as, in the words of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, "to reduce the tragic conse-
quences of her immature conduct and unfortunate marriage."' 82
In such a situation, the state's interest in applying its own law
(rather than the law of the place of celebration) to determine
marital status of its domiciliaries was actually aligned with one
party's interest, even though opposed to the other's interest.
When third-parties attacked the validity of the marriage, how-
ever, over the objection of one or both spouses, recognition was
more likely to be granted.183
In other procedural postures, other forces were at work.
When the validity of a marriage was relevant after the death of
one of the parties such as in a probate or wrongful death pro-
ceeding, the state's interest in preventing cohabitation by a
couple prohibited from marrying was non-existent. In California,
for example, an appellate court permitted two wives, parties to
polygamous unions celebrated abroad, to inherit equal shares
from their shared husband's estate despite noting the state's
strong public policy against polygamy and its general refusal to
recognize such unions. 84 In the same vein, a Mississippi court in
1948 permitted the surviving spouse of an out-of-state, interracial
marriage to inherit from her husband's estate under the rules of
intestate succession, even though such a relationship contravened
the state's public policy. 185 Courts in many states thus gave effect
to certain "incidents" of a marriage, such as the right to inherit a
spousal share, even though unwilling to recognize the marriage
per se, an approach that has earned support from modern con-
flicts scholars.186
182 Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 69 (N.J. 1958).
183 See Borchers, Baker v. General Motors, supra note 79, at 156-57 (noting the
"uphill battle" faced by most third-parties launching collateral attacks on prohibited
marriages from out of state).
184 See In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
185 See Miller v. Lucks, 36 So.2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948); see also In re Lenherr's
Estate, 314 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974) (permitting wife, married evasively in violation of
remarriage restriction, to claim a marital exemption from an inheritance tax).
186 See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., CoNFLicr OF LAWS § 13.2 at 546 (3d ed. 2000) (noting
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C. Interests Supporting a Historical Pro-Recognition Approach
Traditionally, the desire to avoid illegitimating children of a
marriage-by declaring the marriage invalid or void-played an
important role in rulings on recognition.'87 Before the wide-
spread adoption of statutes to the contrary, children born to a
marriage that was declared void might be rendered
illegitimate.
188
The expectations of the parties themselves played an impor-
tant role, too. As Justice Jackson once stated, "[i]f there is one
thing that the people are entitled to expect from their lawmakers,
it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether they
are married and, if so, to whom.' 8 9 The Second Restatement
notes the "strong inclination to uphold a marriage because of the
hardship that might otherwise be visited upon the parties and
their children."' 190 Marriages typically survived state lines, and
individuals thus ordered their lives on that assumption.' 91
Another set of concerns relates to the protection of either
party against unilateral dissolution. Leading conflicts expert Jo-
seph Story supported a blanket rule of recognition, because the
"minor inconveniences" of recognition were outweighed by:
[I]ntroducing distinctions as to the designs and objects and
motives of the parties, to shake the general confidence in such
that courts, recently, "have begun to recognize that the enjoyment of different inci-
dents of marriage involves different policies[.] Consequently, a uniform reference to
a single state to resolve all choice-of-law questions involving marriage cannot be
expected."); Kay, supra note 59, at 71 (discussing the "incidents" approach to con-
flict of laws); Koppelman, supra note 61, at 984-85; see also Charles W. Taintor, II,
Marriage in the Conflict of Laws, 9 VAND. L. REV. 607, 614-16 (1956).
187 See, e.g., Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157 (1819) (bemoaning the tragic ef-
fect on children of invalidating their parents' marriage).
188 See, e.g., JOSEPH R. CLEVENGER, ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE § 417 at 452
(1946) ("By statutes the children of a marriage annulled upon any authorized
ground are either deemed legitimate children or may be adjudged the legitimate
children, of either or both parents.").
189 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
1 90 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. h (1971).
191 BISHOP, supra note 137, at 307 ("Marriage being, unlike divorce, approved and
favored in every country, if, at any place where parties may be, whether transiently
or permanently there, they enter into what by the law of the place is a marriage, they
will be holden everywhere else, as well as there, to be husband and wife."); LONG,
supra note 132, at 86 ("The well-being of society, the legitimacy of offspring, and the
disposition of property alike demand that one state or country shall recognize the
validity of marriages contracted in other states or countries, according to the laws of
the latter, unless some positive statute or pronounced public policy of the particular
state demands otherwise.").
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marriages, to subject the innocent issue to constant doubts as
to their own legitimacy, and to leave the parents themselves to
cut adrift from their solemn obligations when they may be-
come discontented with their lot. 92
When marital status (and, because of the potential lack of bio-
logical connection, parental status) can change by crossing a state
line, a number of unintended consequences can result, some of
which are probably more offensive to a state's public policy than
the marriage itself. Refusal of recognition can sometimes lead to
perverse results. One concern, for example, about "legalized po-
lygamy," in which a person is married in one state but technically
single and eligible to marry again across state lines, is alluded to
by many treatises as a further justification for the place of cele-
bration rule.19 3
D. Contemporary Theories of Recognition
Taken together, interstate recognition cases reveal a long his-
tory during which "American courts have shown substantial, but
not unlimited, tolerance for marriages invalid under their
law." 194 The virtual uniformity of state marriage laws in the
modern era has meant that relatively few cases were litigated in
the 1970s-1990s. But, still, the general rule of recognition has
held strong, leading a modern conflicts treatise to note the "over-
whelming tendency" in the United States to grant recognition to
marriages valid where performed. 195 Although the historical tra-
ditions with respect to marriage recognition were hardly the
product of a coherent, theoretical framework, they are, in broad
brush, replicated by modern conflict of laws theories and
doctrines.
The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, adopted in 1934,
mirrors many of the rules described in the preceding Parts of this
Article. Its general rule, embodied in section 121, is that "a mar-
192 STORY, supra note 105, at 215.
193 See LONG, supra note 132, at 98; see also BISHOP, supra note 137, at 310 (not-
ing that refusing recognition to a marriage valid elsewhere could lead to an "interna-
tional polygamy, more detestable than any purely municipal one ever known").
194 Borchers, Baker v. General Motors, supra note 79, at 156. The conventional
rules were acknowledged, with apparent approval, by the Supreme Court in Lough-
ran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934) ("Marriages not polygamous or incestuous, or
otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the State where en-
tered into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction.").
195 WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CON-
FLICr OF LAWS 362 (2d ed. 1993).
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riage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law
of the state where the contract of marriage takes place are com-
plied with." 96 Though the comments note that it is the parties'
domicile that "ultimately creates" marital status, the validity of
that characterization depends on the general recognition states
give to one another's marriages.' 97 Only in "rare cases," the
comments note, do states refuse to play along, thereby undermin-
ing the domiciliary state's ability to determine status.'
98
The "rare cases" are embodied in exceptions to the Restate-
ment's general rule. Section 131 states that a remarriage in viola-
tion of a post-divorce ban from the domicile state will be valid
everywhere unless the time for appeal of the divorce has not
passed or the statute forbidding remarriage has been interpreted
to have extraterritorial effect.199
Section 132 incorporates common exceptions for polygamous
marriage, "incestuous marriage between persons so closely re-
lated that their marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of
the domicil," interracial marriage "where such marriages are at
the domicil regarded as odious," and marriages "which a statute
at the domicil makes void even though celebrated in another
state., 2 00 These exceptions acknowledge "the paramount inter-
est of the domiciliary state in the marital status" by protecting
against offense of "a strong policy of the domiciliary state."
2 0
'
The First Restatement does not expressly incorporate a marriage
evasion rule, though it notes in the comments that a state may
independently choose to adopt one alongside the other
provisions.2 °2
The First Restatement was thus both narrower and broader
than the general approach taken by courts at the time it was
adopted, but the touchstone principles overlapped considerably.
It was less tolerant than a jurisdiction following a pure rule of
evasion, since the Restatement contemplated non-recognition for
non-evasive marriages if they were "odious" to a state's policy.
20 3
196 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 121 (1934).
197 See id. § 121 cmt. d.
198 Id.
199 See id. § 131. The comment to this provision notes that if an individual
changes his domicile, the ban from the original domicile state will be inapplicable.
See id. § 131 cmt. a.
200 Id. § 132.
201 Id. § 132 cmts. a & b.
202 See id. § 121 cmt. g.
203 Comment c to section 132 states that "a marriage, to be odious as the word is
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At the same time, it contemplated recognition of evasive mar-
riages as long as they did not run afoul of any other exception. 20 4
But, in general, the First Restatement lives up to its name and
mirrors the common law principles that had developed during
the previous century.
The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, adopted in 1971,
departs structurally from the First Restatement's approach,
though not necessarily to different effect in many cases. Section
283 states that the validity of a marriage should be determined by
the state with the "most significant relationship to the spouses
and the marriage," and that a marriage that is valid where cele-
brated is valid everywhere "unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant relation-
ship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the mar-
"1205 T~msriage. In most cases, the state with the most significant
relationship to the parties and their union at its creation will be
the parties' then current domicile.2 °6 This approach, described
by Professor Andrew Koppelman as the "[s]ettling it [o]nce and
207 ttsbofor [a]ll" approach, gives states broad discretion to refuse rec-
ognition to evasive marriages, but not to refuse recognition to
non-evasive marriages of which they simply disapprove. It also
narrows the evasion exception to include only those marriages
that were both evasive and violative of the state's strong public
policy. Thus not every difference in state law, on this view, is
sufficient to characterize a marriage as "evasive" such that re-
fusal of recognition would be appropriate. The comments to sec-
tion 283 note that the two most important choice-of-law factors
used in this Section, must not only be prohibited by statute but must offend a deep-
rooted sense of morality predominant in the state." Id. § 132 cmt. c.
204 Comment e notes that a marriage evasion law would fall under the positive law
exception. See id. § 132 cmt. e.
205 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 283(1)-(2) (1971) (emphasis
added).
206 See Singer, supra note 103 ("[I]t is elementary conflict of laws reasoning that
the current domicile of the parties is almost certain to be the state that has the most
significant relationship with the parties and the transaction."); see also Cox, supra
note 130, at 1090-91. Scholars have also argued that when a married couple has only
transient contacts with a state, that state does not have a significant enough interest
in the marriage to deny recognition. Thus when one spouse is killed while passing
through a state, the state should not be permitted to refuse to recognize the surviv-
ing spouse for wrongful death purposes even if it generally prohibits the particular
marriage. See Koppelman, supra note 61, at 988.207 See Koppelman, supra note 61, at 981 (comparing and contrasting different
possible approaches to the question of marriage recognition). This approach has
been expressly adopted in roughly half the states. See id.
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in the marriage context are protecting the justified expectations
of the parties and implementing the "relevant policies of the
state with the dominant interest" in the issue. 0 8
Other theories of conflict of laws-notably those offered by
Professor Brainerd Currie20 9 and Professor Robert Leflar 210 _
support an approach similar to that found in the Second Restate-
ment, one that generally favors recognition but recognizes the
ability of a state to override based on a strong public policy ob-
jection. What all contemporary theories share, putting aside
some technical differences, is the view that the decision whether
to recognize a prohibited out-of-state marriage is fact-dependent,
complicated, and generally not amenable to categorical rule.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), 21' the only
uniform marriage act still urged for adoption, adopts an even
more pro-recognition approach. It establishes a uniform set of
impediments and a rule of marriage recognition. Section 207 de-
fines only two categories of prohibited marriages: a "marriage
entered into prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage of one
of the parties"; and a marriage between "an ancestor and a de-
scendant," "a brother and a sister," "an uncle and a niece," or
"an aunt and a nephew. 21 2 The UMDA "eliminates most of the
traditional marriage prohibitions and, consistent with the na-
tional trend, eliminates all affinity prohibitions. 2 1 3 The Act also
speaks to the validity of common law marriages, but gives two
provisions as alternatives for an adopting state to consider, one
2 0 8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. b (1971).
209 See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
210 See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966).
211 See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 201-206 (amended 1973), 9A
U.L.A. 175 (1998). (The UMDA was later downgraded to a "Model" act and is thus
now termed the Model Marriage and Divorce Act.) This act expressly authorizes
proxy marriages, which many states at the time disallowed. See UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACT § 206 cmt. (amended 1973). The UMDA, like the uniform marriage
and divorce acts that had come before, was basically a failure in terms of the number
of adoptions. Only eight states adopted any substantial part of the act, and only
three of those expressly adopted any part of section II, which laid out the provisions
on marriage. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A.
159 (1998).
212 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 207(a) (amended 1973). The incestuous
relationships covered by this provision included relationships of the half and whole
blood, and, for siblings, ancestors and descendants, relationships of adoption. It
carves out an exception for aunt-nephew or uncle-niece marriages that take place
within "aboriginal cultures."
213 Id. § 207 cmt.
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that validates such marriages, and one that does not.2 14 The
choice reflects the ongoing disagreement among states about the
validity of this type of marriage.
The UMDA's rule of marriage recognition is broader than ei-
ther the common law or restatement approach:
All marriages contracted within this State prior to the effective
date of this Act, or outside this State, that were valid at the
time of the contract or subsequently validated by the laws of
the place in which they were contracted or by the domicil of
the parties, are valid in this State.215
Simply put, this provision adopts a strict version of the "place
of celebration" rule that states had always followed, but ex-
pressly denounces the "public policy" exception that had devel-
oped along with it. According to the official comment, this
section "codifies the emerging conflicts principle that marriages
valid by the laws of the state where contracted should be valid
everywhere, even if the parties to the marriage would not have
been permitted to marry in the state of their domicil."21 6
The UMDA intentionally departs from the Second Restate-
ment approach, which incorporates a public policy exception that
at least covers evasive marriages, and does so with the expecta-
tion that the rule "will preclude invalidation of many marriages
which would have been invalidated in the past." '217 While the
UMDA does define marriage as being "between a man and a
woman," the comment to this provision notes simply that mar-
riage is defined "[i]n accordance with established usage." '18 Al-
though the UMDA's approach is staunchly pro-recognition, it
was promulgated during a period of virtual uniformity of state
marriage laws. Its drafters thus did not have to grapple with the
kind of significant non-uniformity we face today. 19
While these various sources of law or theory vary with respect
to the relative importance they place on domicile versus the
place of celebration, and the degree to which they would factor
214 See id. § 211 (providing alternatives "A" and "B").
215 Id. § 210.
216 Id. § 210 cmt.
217 Id. The comment notes that the UMEA is expressly disapproved by NCCUSL
and should be repealed by any jurisdiction that adopts the UMDA because of the
obvious inconsistency.
218 Id. § 201 cmt.
219 In addition, the more politically charged portion of the UMDA related to di-
vorce since it urged all states to adopt the relatively new no-fault approach to di-
vorce, which represented a significant break with historical tradition.
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in evasive behavior, each replicates the historically flexible and
tolerant approach to interstate marriage recognition.
IV
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE
MODERN LANDSCAPE
The current American landscape, blanketed with heterosexual
definitions of marriage, anti-same-sex-marriage-recognition pro-
visions, and sporadic, left-over anti-evasion provisions, predeter-
mines the question of marriage recognition in many, but not all
jurisdictions. This Part combines conventional rules and modern
statutes to consider how states might address the recognition
questions they will inevitably face. 220 The patchwork of state
statutes and constitutional provisions leaves only a handful of
states in which the common law recognition principles are likely
to come into play. In those states, recognition of same-sex mar-
riages is both possible and perhaps even likely.
As discussed above, the conventional approach to recognition
presumptively honored out-of-state marriages, but permitted
states to refuse recognition in certain circumstances. The posi-
tive law exception, for example, permitted states to refuse recog-
nition to sister state marriages when a statute or constitutional
provision precluded it.221 Traditionally understood, this excep-
tion applied only if the legislature had unmistakably expressed its
intent not only to prohibit a particular type of marriage, but also
to deny recognition to such a union celebrated elsewhere.
Under this formulation, thirty-eight states have a statutory or
constitutional provision sufficient to justify a rule of automatic
non-recognition.222 Alabama law, for example, states that it
"shall not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same
sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of
the law of any jurisdiction. ' '223 Ohio law provides that "[a]ny
marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in any other
jurisdiction shall be considered and treated in all respects as hav-
ing no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be recog-
220 For other useful treatments of modern interstate marriage recognition ques-
tions, see Kay, supra note 59, at 78-80 and Koppelman, supra note 171, at 2143.
221 See supra text accompanying notes 152-69.
222 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
223 ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (1998).
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nized by this state. ' 2 4  Indeed, the only case seeking full
recognition of a same-sex marriage from Massachusetts that has
been decided so far was in Florida, a state with a broadly worded
rule of non-recognition.225 In Wilson v. Ake, a federal district
court in Florida refused to recognize a Massachusetts same-sex
marriage for Florida or federal law purposes.226 Statutes like
these are much more direct than those of an earlier era, and hard
to circumvent if one applies a positive law exception to the rule
of recognition.
The states that do not explicitly ban same-sex mariage at all
would obviously not meet the terms of the positive law excep-
tion. But, arguably, neither would the six states that ban same-
sex marriage without explicitly addressing the question of recog-
nition.227 Of those states, only South Carolina declares a same-
sex marriage "void,' 228 a term that was interpreted in some juris-
dictions, historically, to deny recognition to out-of-state mar-
riages of the specified type.229 Thus, based solely on this one
exception, only a handful of states could grant recognition to a
same-sex marriage from Massachusetts if they were to apply the
traditional rules.
Two modern developments merit discussion, however. First,
the notion that a state can declare certain marriages invalid re-
gardless of where the parties were domiciled at the time the mar-
riage was celebrated is entirely inconsistent with the Second
Restatement's approach to conflict of laws.23 ° This does not
render these enactments invalid, but it does reveal how ex-
traordinary the mini-DOMAs really are and what a departure
they mark from conventional concepts of comity and conflicts.
As Professor Koppelman has noted, before these statutes had
been enacted in most jurisdictions, "[b]lanket nonrecognition of
same-sex marriage ... would be an extraordinary rule. There is
no evidence that any of the legislatures that recently acted gave
224 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(2) (West Supp. 2005).
225 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(1) (West 2005) ("Marriages between persons
of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction.., are not recognized for any pur-
pose in this state.").
226 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303-04, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
227 See supra note 70 (listing states).
228 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Supp. 2004) ("A marriage between persons of
the same sex is void ab initio and against the public policy of this State.").
229 See supra text accompanying notes 163-69.
230 See supra text accompanying notes 205-08.
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any thought to how extraordinary it would be." '231
Second, the positive law obstacles to same-sex marriage recog-
nition could be undone by a ruling that they violate the Federal
Constitution. Depending on the justification, a ruling that
DOMA is unconstitutional may or may not have a ripple effect.
If the Supreme Court were to hold that DOMA was invalid be-
cause it exceeded Congress' power under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, states would presumptively still have the power to
deny recognition under conventional principles of comity and
conflicts. If, on the other hand, DOMA fell to a challenge rooted
in either equal protection or due process principles, then presum-
ably most or all blanket recognition rules at the state level would
fall as well.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's ruling in Romer v.
Evans.232 In Romer, the Court invalidated, under equal protec-
tion principles, a Colorado referendum prohibiting municipalities
from granting rights against sexual orientation discrimination.
The Court held that a statute "born of animosity" toward a par-
ticular group could not survive even the most lenient form of
constitutional scrutiny.233 DOMA, as well as every recently en-
acted state law targeting same-sex marriage, could be invalidated
under this precedent.234
Both federal and state anti-same-sex marriage laws could also
fall to a challenge under Lawrence v. Texas,235 which invalidated
Texas' ban on same-sex sodomy. The broader principle at issue
in Lawrence-the right of adults to engage in consensual inti-
mate relationships-could be interpreted to preclude states or
Congress from banning same-sex marriage.236
So far, this line of argument has been unsuccessful. The plain-
tiffs in Wilson, discussed above, unsuccessfully challenged the
231 Koppelman, supra note 61, at 929-30.
232 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
233 Id. at 634.
234 See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 125 (arguing that DOMA is unconstitutional
under Romer).
235 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
236 See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The Consequences of Lawrence v. Texas, FIN-
DLAw's WRIT, July 8, 2003, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20030708.html.
Cases invoking Lawrence to challenge other laws relating to sex and intimate rela-
tionships have met with mixed results. Compare Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367
(Va. 2005) (invalidating criminal ban on fornication), with Lofton v. Sec'y of the
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding Flor-
ida's ban on adoption by homosexuals).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
constitutionality of DOMA. The court concluded that DOMA
was a valid exercise of Congress' power under Article IV to pre-
scribe the "effect" a state's public act would have in other states.
Otherwise, the court cautioned, "a single State could mandate
that all the States recognize bigamy, polygamy, marriages be-
tween blood relatives or marriages involving minor children. ,237
Under the traditional framework, one might also argue that
same-sex marriage, like incest and polygamy, violates "natural
law," a category of marriage typically exempted from the place-
of-celebration rule.2 38 Structurally, many states ban same-sex
marriage within the same provision as their ban on incest.2 39
And undoubtedly the vehemence of sentiment against same-sex
marriage in many states is comparable to, if not greater than,
that against at least some incestuous marriages.
Yet three modern considerations make it difficult to imagine a
court applying the natural law exception to same-sex marriage.
First, the exception was squarely rooted in religious beliefs-de-
scribed explicitly as marriages in violation of "Christendom. 
' 240
A court today could hardly justify refusing recognition to a mar-
riage because of such a violation, without running seriously afoul
of the Establishment Clause. 41
Second, the Supreme Court's ruling in Lawrence v. Texas
questioned the ability of a state to rely on morality to justify
withholding important rights from classes of citizens. While the
reach of Lawrence is far from settled, it may be interpreted to
prevent a state from exempting a single class of marriages from a
general rule of recognition based solely on moral repugnance.
Several states have done exactly that by retaining a general rule
of recognition subject to an exception just for same-sex
237 Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304 n.6 (M.D. Fla. 2005). As discussed
above, a federal court in Nebraska did strike down a mini-DOMA, but the core ban
on same-sex marriage might well have survived if the statute hadn't swept so
broadly. See Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D.
Neb. 2005).
238 See supra text accompanying notes 140-51.
239 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (2000) (including only incestuous
and same-sex marriages under the heading "[v]oid and prohibited" marriages).
240 See, e.g., LONG, supra note 132, at 87 (describing polygamous and incestuous
marriages as "repugnant to the moral sense of Christendom").
241 See Singer, supra note 103 ("[I]f the government interest [in opposing same-
sex marriage] is in establishing a particular religious definition of marriage ... then
asserting this moral interest to justify nonrecognition would seem to be prohibited




Third, this exception was given life in part by the universality
of bans on the marriages it covered.243 States rarely, if ever, were
asked to recognize polygamous marriages or marriages between
ancestors and descendants or brothers and sisters because no
American state permitted them to occur. Today, the emerging
protection for same-sex marriage-albeit piecemeal and scat-
tered-defies the universality characteristic of the marriages tra-
ditionally subject to the exception. That one state allows such
marriages, and that several others may do so in the near future,
means that same-sex marriage is no longer considered universally
taboo. At the same time, the traditional "universal" exceptions
continue to be, within the United States, universal.
In addition to the positive and natural law exceptions, evasive
marriage behavior traditionally played a role in many recognition
cases whether or not there was a specific statute banning it.
244
The Second Restatement approach, which permits a state to re-
fuse recognition based on public policy grounds only if it has the
most significant connection to the relationship at the time of the
marriage, seems to support non-recognition for evasive mar-
riages, absent significant countervailing factors.2 45 However,
since Massachusetts is currently refusing to issue marriage li-
censes to non-resident couples under its reverse marriage evasion
law,2 46 the role of evasion in same-sex marriage recognition
might at least momentarily elude testing.
The best scenario for recognition would involve a non-evasive
marriage where the couple originally resides in Massachusetts
and then, unrelated to marriage laws, moves to one of the non-
242 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107(a)-(b) (2004) ("All marriages con-
tracted outside this state which would be valid by the laws of the state or country in
which the marriages were consummated and in which the parties then actually re-
sided shall be valid in *all the courts in this state."); id. § 9-11-107(b) ("This section
shall not apply to a marriage between persons of the same sex.").
243 Treatises often referred to the "universal exceptions" when describing the gen-
eral refusal to recognize polygamous and incestuous marriages from other states.
244 See supra text accompanying note 155.
245 See supra text accompanying note 205.
246 See Pam Belluck, Romney Won't Let Gay Outsiders Wed in Massachusetts,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, § 1, at 1; see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 11 (Lexis
Nexis 2003) (prohibiting non-residents from marrying in Massachusetts "if such mar-
riage would be void if contracted" in their home state). A challenge to the validity
of the evasion law is currently pending before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. See Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, No. SJC-09436 (argued October
6, 2005).
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DOMA states.247 In that scenario, conventional principles sug-
gest that the marriage should be granted full recognition. That
exact scenario has yet to be presented to a court, but undoubt-
edly will be in the future.
A strong case for recognition is presented in Langan v. St. Vin-
cent's Hospital. 48 There, the plaintiff sought recognition as a
"spouse" for purposes of standing to sue under New York law for
the alleged wrongful death of his same-sex partner, with whom
he had established a civil union in Vermont.2 49 The landscape in
New York is favorable for a recognition claim since there is no
constitutional or statutory provision banning recognition, nor
even one explicitly banning same-sex marriage. The trial court
began its analysis by noting New York's adherence to the "place
of celebration" rule,25 0 and observing the limited exceptions to
the rule for marriages involving incestuous or polygamous mar-
251riages. Citing many examples of New York's protection for
same-sex couples and gays and lesbians individually, 2  the court
concluded that New York has no public policy against same-sex
marriage and thus no basis for refusing recognition under "prin-
ciples of full faith and credit and comity. ' '2 53  The court also
noted that its conclusion "advances the concept that citizens
ought to be able to move from one state to another without con-
cern for the validity or recognition of their marital status. "254
The trial court's decision was recently reversed by an intermedi-
247 See Borchers, Essential Irrelevance, supra note 79, at 357 ("Perhaps the best
case that could be made for a constitutional duty to apply the celebration state's law
would involve a couple genuinely domiciled in a state allowing same-sex marriages
and then becoming involved in litigation in a state that does not allow them."); Kop-
pelman, supra note 171, at 2153-54 (treating "'migratory' marriages" as the best case
scenario for recognition); see also Borchers, Baker v. General Motors, supra note
79, at 171 ("Most courts will probably recognize same-sex marriages under these
circumstances, even if they generally would not validate such marriages."); Mark
Strasser, Loving the Romer out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the
Constitution, 58 U. Pi-r. L. Rnv. 279, 280 (1997) (describirig non-evasive same-sex
marriage as the best case for recognition).
248 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), rev'd, No. 2003-04702, slip op. (N.Y.
App. Div. Oct. 11, 2005).
249 See id.
250 Id. at 414.
251 Id.
252 Examples include the lack of a mini-DOMA, statutes banning sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, a New York City ordinance permitting domestic partners to reg-
ister, and a state statute permitting recovery by same-sex surviving partners of 9/11
victims. Id. at 415-16.




ate appellate court, which refused to even consider the principles
of marriage recognition since the status presented was a civil
union rather than a marriage per se.255
The trial court's approach, if reinstated by New York's highest
court, could be used to support a full-recognition principle, since
the justification for the recognition was rooted primarily in the
fact that New York lacks a public policy against same-sex mar-
riage. That result is supported by an opinion of the state's attor-
ney general, concluding that while current New York law does
not permit same-sex couples to marry, its precedents dictate that
a same-sex marriage from elsewhere should be recognized.256
A narrower "incidents" approach to recognition was used his-
torically to validate marriages that were obviously abhorrent to
the forum state, including not only interracial marriages, but also
the universally objectionable polygamous and incestuous ones.
Under current law, an incidents approach is statutorily barred in
the eleven states that explicitly refuse to recognize any claim,
right, or incident arising out of a prohibited same-sex mar-
riage.2 57 The other twenty-seven states that expressly address
recognition of out-of-state marriages decree that a same-sex mar-
riage will not be "valid" or "recognized," but do not explicitly
negate the possibility that an incident of it might be.258 The
twelve states that do not address recognition of out-of-state
same-sex marriages at all might also employ this approach on a
case-by-case basis in place of full recognition. 9 In at least one
of those states, the attorney general has issued an opinion stating
that particular incidents of a same-sex marriage will be recog-
255 See Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., No. 2003-04702, slip op. (N.Y. App. Div.
Oct. 11, 2005).
256 See 2004 N.Y. Op. (Inf.) Att'y Gen. 1, 34 (2004) ("Consistent with the holding
of the only state court to have ruled on this question, New York law presumptively
requires that parties to such unions must be treated as spouses for purposes of New
York law."). The Attorney General for Rhode Island drew a similar conclusion in
an official statement. See Press Release, State of Rhode Island, Department of At-
torney General, Attorney General Lynch's statement concerning same-sex marriage
(May 17, 2004), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/public/pr.php?ID=209 ("This
Office's review of Rhode Island law suggests that Rhode Island would recognize any
[same-sex] marriage validly performed in another state unless doing so would run
contrary to the strong public policy of this State.").
257 See supra note 71.
258 See supra notes 69 & 70.
259 See supra notes 70 & 73. Massachusetts would presumably recognize a same-
sex marriage from anywhere, though the state code has not been amended to incor-
porate same-sex marriages.
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nized in the state. 6 °
While there are few rulings regarding out-of-state recognition
of a Massachusetts same-sex marriage,261 the slightly larger body
of cases on recognition of Vermont civil unions shows mixed re-
sults with the incidents approach. The existing rulings regarding
the validity of Vermont civil unions have dealt mostly with the
question of divorce-whether a party to a civil union can seek a
divorce outside of Vermont. Vermont requires a six-month pe-
riod of residency as a prerequisite for filing a petition for di-
vorce, 262 and, since eighty-five percent of Vermont civil unions
have been entered into by non-residents,263 many unhappy civil
union partners have sought relief in their home states.
In the first such case, Rosengarten v. Downes,264 a Connecticut
trial court dismissed the plaintiff's petition for divorce for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The appellate court upheld the dis-
missal, since the governing statute provides for jurisdiction over
matters involving "dissolution of marriage" and a civil union,
even under Vermont law, is not a "marriage. '265 Although the
case technically turned on an interpretation of the jurisdiction
statute, the underlying issue of recognition was inextricable. 66
On that score, the court noted a Connecticut statute declaring
the "public policy" against same-sex unions, and concluded that
"because the legislature expressly refused to endorse or author-
ize such unions it could not have intended civil unions to be
treated as family matters [for jurisdictional purposes]. 26 7 Since
the court viewed Connecticut's public policy to be inconsistent
with same-sex marriage generally, it refused to exercise jurisdic-
260 See Connecticut Op. Att'y Gen. (Aug. 2, 2004) (opining that a same-sex mar-
riage from Massachusetts can be recognized for purposes of changing one's surname
on a driver's license and registration).
261 See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
262 VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15., § 592 (1989). The residency must have continued for a
year before a final decree can be granted. Id.
263 See Fred A. Bernstein, Gay Unions Were Only Half the Battle, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 6, 2003, § 9, at 2.
264 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
265 Id. at 174-75. The Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed to review the appel-
late court's decision, see 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002), but the question was mooted
by the death of one of the parties. See Bernstein, supra note 263; see generally Kay,
supra note 59 (discussing Rosengarten).
266 See Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 175.
267 Id. at 177. On the legal issues surrounding dissolution of same-sex unions gen-
erally, see Kay, supra note 59 (analyzing issues raised by efforts to dissolve same-sex
marriages, domestic partnerships, and civil unions in jurisdictions other than the one
where it was formed).
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tion over a petition to dissolve a same-sex union. The court
failed to consider the possibility that it might recognize an out-of-
state union for some purposes, such as dissolution, without fully
accepting it.
Courts in other states, however, have granted recognition to
Vermont civil unions at least for the limited purpose of dissolving
them. In Salucco v. Aldredge, a Superior Court judge in Massa-
chusetts drew on its equity jurisdiction to dissolve the parties'
civil union.268 This result was not surprising, since the case came
after the ruling in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health269
in a state with a clear public policy in favor of protecting same-
sex relationships. But trial judges in states without such a
favorable landscape have issued similar rulings, without any dis-
cussion about jurisdiction or the broader question of recognition.
A judge in West Virginia, for example, granted dissolution based
on "irreconcilable differences," noting only that the parties were
"in need of a judicial remedy to dissolve a legal relationship cre-
ated by the laws of another state. ' 27 ° A judge in Iowa issued a
similar ruling, although it substituted a second version of the rul-
ing that deleted any reference to recognizing the civil union.271
A judge in Texas had done likewise,272 but vacated the ruling be-
cause of pressure from the state's attorney general to avoid rec-
ognition of the couple's relationship.273
The willingness of states to recognize Vermont civil unions for
some or all purposes has been tested in a few contexts other than
divorce, again with mixed results. A Georgia appellate court, for
example, ruled in Burns v. Burns that a woman was not "mar-
ried" to her civil union partner for purposes of measuring her
compliance with an order specifying that visitation with her chil-
dren would not be allowed when she was cohabitating with an
adult to whom she was not legally married.274 The court's ruling
relied in part on the fact that a civil union, under Vermont law, is
not a "civil marriage," but also on the Georgia statute explicitly
268 Mass. L. Rptr. 498, 511 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2004).
269 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
270 See Bernstein, supra note 263.
271 See Frank Santiago, Judge Revises His Ruling on Lesbians' Divorce, DES
MOINES REGISTER, Dec. 31, 2003, at 3B.
27 2 See Divorce-Homosexuality-Civil Union-Full Faith and Credit, 30 FAMILY L.
REP. (BNA) 1094 (Dec. 23, 2003).
273 See Bernstein, supra note 263.
274 See Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
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refusing recognition to an out-of-state same-sex marriage.
The trial court's approach in Langan, discussed above, could
alternatively be used to support an incidents approach to recog-
nition as well, since the specific purposes of the wrongful death
law were important to the court's decision to grant recognition
and may not have compelled the same result in a different
context.276
The potential for unilateral dissolution of parental status
presents a very strong argument in favor of permitting at least
incidental recognition of same-sex unions, regardless of a state's
policy against the union itself. A state's refusal to recognize, for
example, an adoption or other parent-child relationship validly
created in another state, can wreak havoc on a child's or her par-
ents' lives.277
CONCLUSION
States with a bar to interstate recognition of same-sex marriage
should reconsider the wisdom of such an approach, given the un-
precedented nature of blanket non-recognition and the hardship
that may be wrought in an individual case in which a compelling
case for recognition is presented. 278 The more immediate con-
cern, however, is with states without such a bar, in which the rec-
ognition question is certain to be raised in the near future.
Several interests in favor of recognition may be implicated in
such a case.
Although many states have a deep desire to avoid recognizing
same-sex marriages, many of the justifications historically used to
275 See id.; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004).
276 See 765 N.Y.S.2d at 419 (noting that the legislative purpose of the wrongful
death law, to compensate the "person most likely to have expected support and to
have suffered pecuniary injury" would be served by recognizing a civil union partner
as a "spouse" for this purpose).
277 See S. Mitra Kalita, Vt. Same-Sex Unions Null in Va., Judge Rules, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 25, 2004, at B1 (reporting on refusal by county court to recognize a
parent-child relationship created by virtue of a Vermont civil union); see also Naomi
Cahn, Between Two Mommies: When Gay Unions Dissolve, Children Bring Special
Complications, LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2005, at 22 (considering the portability of
parental status for children born within same-sex relationships). A lawsuit pending
in federal court is challenging a recently enacted Oklahoma law that prohibits recog-
nition of "an adoption by more than one individual of the same sex from any other
state or foreign jurisdiction." See Finstuen v. Edmondson, No. CIV-04-1152-C
(W.D. Okla. 2004) (challenging the validity of OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4
(2001)).
278 See Koppelman, supra note 61, at 929-30.
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justify non-recognition of disfavored marriages are no longer
permissible. As Professor Tobias Wolff has pointed out, mar-
riage bans often came in tandem with criminal laws against co-
habitation or fornication. Together, these laws prevented
disfavored couples from having any lawful relationship. 27 9 To-
day, however, a state cannot constitutionally criminalize sodomy
or fornication under Lawrence v. Texas.28° Thus, one of the
traditional justifications for refusing to honor forbidden mar-
riages-that by doing so a state could prohibit the only lawful
form of sexual intimacy-no longer applies. States are also pre-
cluded, under current interpretations of the right to travel, from
adopting laws in order to deter disfavored groups from entering
the state. 281 State laws refusing to recognize valid same-sex mar-
riages from other jurisdictions risk running afoul of that constitu-
tional principle as well.282 The strong interests in favor of
recognition are thus subjected to very meager counterweights.
While the UMDA was passed long before the same-sex marriage
debate began in earnest, its approach to marriage recognition is
at least worth revisiting.
The legal developments in the same-sex marriage context,
many of which are recounted in this Article, have been unfortu-
nate in several ways. The misapprehension about the meaning of
full faith and credit and the specter of compelled recognition led
states to adopt extraordinary, historically unprecedented rules.
Those rules, both overly broad and ambiguous in scope, mean
that most states cannot voluntarily recognize same-sex marriages,
even in a case where the state has no interest in denying
recognition.
Categorical non-recognition of same-sex marriage defies both
the modern approach to conflict of laws and the historical ap-
proach to marriage recognition. History in this context teaches
the workability of a case-by-case approach and shows the value
states once placed on comity and interstate respect in the mar-
279 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage
Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2215, 2218 (2005).
280 See, e.g., Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Va. 2005) (invalidating criminal
ban on fornication under the principles of Lawrence v. Texas).
281 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999) (noting that the constitution does
not permit states to adopt rules "for the purpose of inhibiting the migration" of the
poor to the state); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) ("[T]he purpose of
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riage context. Tolerance of disfavored marriages was an impor-
tant and widespread value, which was honored by a strong
general rule of marriage recognition. But the traditional rules
also made room for states to assert their individuality and unique
values and to deny recognition to avoid contravening a strong
public policy of the state. A broad rule of recognition-whether
based on the place of celebration or the place of domicile-pre-
serves the values of comity, uniformity, and the portability of
marital status. Greater attention to history might have produced
more sensible rules of recognition than the ones we now face.
Even so, the non-DOMA states have the opportunity to borrow
the lessons of history as they craft their response to the modern
version of an age-old question.
